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Chapter 1- Introduction 
After George Papandreou, the newly elected prime minister of Greece, in late 2009 revealed 
that Greek public debt and deficit figures for years had been massively misrepresented by his 
predecessor’s government, the stage was set for a decisive new chapter in the history of the 
European Union (EU) (Pisani-Ferry, Jean, 2014:8). Greece was forced to request financial 
aid, and later they were followed by Ireland and Portugal. The situation dramatically 
worsened when the much larger countries Spain and Italy were proven to have similar debt 
problems. The European debt crisis1 would abruptly evolve into a large-scale crisis beyond 
just the Eurozone countries, affecting the rest of the EU member states, as well as severely 
influencing global markets. The debt crisis would alter the European agenda for many years, 
with restructuring efforts, disagreements about the direction forward, bailouts, rising 
unemployment, growing interest rates and austerity policies stealing the headlines. As a 
consequence of this, the political implications were also substantial. Incumbent governments 
in many Eurozone countries would go on to lose subsequent elections, and public dismay, 
particularly in the member states where the austerity measures had the most devastating 
immediate effect, was widespread. This had a substantial effect on the European Commission 
(EC), as the leading organization of the EU. Instead of focusing its efforts on agriculture, 
trade and standardization, the agenda had to be turned around, in order for the EC to able to 
extinguish the flames of the crisis.  
     Personally, my perception of the EU was forever altered after the crisis broke out. Of 
course, like most people, I knew what the EU was, roughly what its purpose was, where it 
was based, and that “those guys” managed the euro. But not much beyond that. Post-crisis? 
Overnight, the EU and the crisis was everywhere in the news. Abruptly, I heard about the 
European Central Bank (ECB), the Council of the European Union (the Council) and the 
(European) Court of Justice (ECJ). But it was one part of the EU puzzle that fascinated me the 
most, the European Commission. It might just have been the weight of the name, the 
commanding resonance, or simply just the structure of it all, but I was indeed fascinated. 
When I started to prepare for this thesis, I initially contemplated choosing the EC as a case, 
but then I chose to go bigger, I went with the EU itself as my case. However, eventually I 
 
1 Many terms are applied to describe the crisis, i.e. the Eurozone crisis and the European debt crisis. It will be 
referred to as the European debt crisis, the debt crisis or simply, the crisis, in this article.  
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realized the EU would not be very feasible, and I returned to my initial plan of choosing the 
EC as a case.  
     As the debt crisis had such a devastating effect on the European continent for years, it 
would soon have consequences beyond the realm of finances and enter the political limelight. 
Soon enough, the EU, and the EC, would feel the effects of the crisis turn back on them. In 
light of this, one could ask whether – and to what extent – the EC might be viewed as 
suffering from a loss of legitimacy following the devastating economic effects the European 
debt crisis had on several of its member states. As a few years have passed since the height of 
the crisis, and as most European economies slowly are recovering, I think now is an excellent 
time to study the effects the crisis had on the EC’s legitimacy. The time is right because the 
dust has settled somewhat, and the debt crisis no longer is the subject of daily news coverage. 
I find it particularly interesting because a crisis of this magnitude in my view may have the 
potential to change many people’s view of both the EC, as well as the EU. Before the crisis 
most people would either be somewhat negative, somewhat positive or did not care or know 
too much about what the EC was. In the years following the debt crisis, people instead may 
have become more conscious about the EC, skepticism towards it could have become more 
widespread. As such, my formulation of the research questions (RQ) stands as follows: 
 
“What have been the effects of the European debt crisis on the EC’s legitimacy as an 
organization?” 
 
The research question will serve as the basis of the master thesis and will be examined 
through the lens of Hamilton’s model of ‘organizational loss of legitimacy’. This model 
provides a theoretical/conceptual framework for characterizing ‘organizational loss of 
legitimacy’ and can in my view be used to study the effect the crisis has had on the EU’s 
legitimacy. The model argues that when an organization faces loss of legitimacy, it can trigger 
events that lead to an organizational crisis, or organizational death (Hamilton, 2006:332-333). 
Organizational death will not be the included in my application of the model. Instead, my 
emphasis will be on organizational loss of legitimacy, the precursor to a legitimacy crisis. 
Although Hamilton’s model is applied to private organizations in her article, I assess it to be 
general enough to be applicable to other organizations or institutions. I will expand on why I 
think that is, in section 3.3. 
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     The structure of this thesis following the introduction is as follows: 
Chapter 2 will discuss the context and the background of the European Union, the European 
Commission, the euro, the European debt crisis, as well as introducing a number of 
established legitimacy issues the EC and the EU had been struggling with in the years prior to 
the crisis.  
     Chapter 3 will examine the theoretical framework of the thesis, first reviewing existing 
literature on the legitimacy of organizations, before going further into detail on Hamilton’s 
model, as well as expanding on the four propositions. This will be followed up by a section 
where I will assess whether or not the model is applicable to public organizations as well as 
the private organizations studied by Hamilton. Additionally, the mentioned propositions are 
discussed in further detail, before I assess whether they are applicable to my study of the EC 
during the debt crisis. In addition, I argue whether or not the model can be restated, in order to 
better suit the study of the EC during the crisis. Finally, the chapter includes a section where I 
operationalize every proposition, in order to facilitate measuring them.  
     Chapter 4 reviews the methodological choices for the measurement of every proposition, 
in addition to assess which type of case study is best suited for the thesis. Moreover, the 
collected data for the thesis will then be presented and discussed. Next, the different potential 
methods best suited for the propositions are debated. At the end, questions of measurement 
issues, in addition to reliability and validity are discussed.  
     Chapter 5 analyzes all the findings for the different proposition, and the chapter is finished 
with a brief general discussion about the findings.  
     Chapter 6 answers every proposition, as well the research question. While the final section 
discusses how this work can be built upon, and discusses limitations to my study, as well as 










Chapter 2 - Context 
In order to fully grasp the scale of the impact the debt crisis had on the European 
Commission’s (EC) legitimacy as an organization, the background of the crisis needs to be 
explored. This entails background on the EU and the EC, the Euro, as well as both the debt 
crisis and its precursor, the financial crisis of 2007-2008. These four topics are linked 
together. The Euro would naturally not be a phenomenon if the EU did not exist (at least as 
we know it), and several scholars would claim that the debt crisis could have been avoided 
had it not been for the Euro or if its participation criteria had been strictly managed. In 
addition, despite some observers’ claim that a crisis within the Eurozone was inevitable 
(Blyth, 2013; Hall 2012), the financial crisis originating in the US ultimately triggered the 
debt crisis.  
     This chapter will shed light on the four mentioned topics, the EU, the Euro, the financial 
crisis and the debt crisis. First, I will give a brief overview of the EU and its history, with 
emphasis on key events that furthered European integration, and why such an expansion of its 
policy areas and size was seen necessary by the European leadership and key state leaders. In 
addition, I provide a short timeline for the EC’s history from its inception until today and 
discuss how it has developed. Second, I will discuss the timeline of the implementation of the 
Euro, from the inception of the idea of a common currency, via the key events that lead to its 
creation during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and the implementation itself from 1999 until 
2002. Furthermore, I will discuss why nation-states such as Greece were allowed to become a 
part of the Euro, without meeting the convergence criteria set by the Maastricht Treaty, and 
why European leaders viewed it as vital to include such countries (European Commission, 
2019b). In the third part I will study the two crises, with a little background and what effects 
the financial crisis had on Europe and how it helped trigger the European debt crisis. The debt 
crisis will be discussed in detail, with a timeline, an overview and more a more in-depth look 
at some key events, as well discussing some of the responses the European leadership had to 
the crises. At the end there will be a discussion of how these various topics are connected to 
the legitimacy of the EU and EC (in section 2.6).  
 
2.1 – The European Union 
The research question of this thesis seeks to understand the connection between the European 
debt crisis and the legitimacy of the European Commission. Therefore, is it important to 
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understand the role, powers and structure of the European Commission, in addition to the 
background and the development of the EU as a whole. So, this section will discuss such 
topics as the early idea of European integration, some of the key people in the foundation of 
the early cooperation, the driving forces for further integration, expansions, legitimacy of the 
European project and a timeline of the European Commission’s development.  
 
2.1.1 – Ideas of Unity 
The idea of a united Europe dates back long before the creation of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. Ideas of European unity were shared already following the 
American Revolutionary war by Marquis de Lafayette, a French military officer who fought 
the British alongside the Americans. He expressed interest in the idea of a United States of 
Europe based on the model of the American system of states. This idea was later repeated by 
novelist Victor Hugo and Italian politician Giuseppe Mazzini in the 19th century (Dinan, 
2004, p. 3). However, it was not until the catastrophe of the First World War that visionaries 
en masse proceeded to truly put this idea on the agenda, right across the political spectrum. 
Furthermore, the devastating impact of the Second World War would fuel the support for 
such a union further. Europe had seen tens of millions of people lose their lives, and the 
prospect of another war of this magnitude or worse was something that had to be eliminated 
(Dinan, 2004, p. 9). During the war, the French diplomat Jean Monnet started discussing these 
ideas with Allied leaders and claimed that there would be no lasting peace in Europe if the 
states were constituted based on national sovereignty. He further claimed that the countries of 
Europe were too small to guarantee their citizens the necessary prosperity and development; 
thus, the states of Europe should work to become a federation. A united Europe, integrated in 
terms of economy and military, would strengthen prosperity and hinder their motivation for 
intercontinental war (European Union, 2020). Similar ideas were also shared by the Italian 
politician Altiero Spinelli, who during his years as a political prisoner in Mussolini’s fascist 
Italy was the primary author of the Ventotene Manifesto2. This manifesto claimed that the 
only way to ensure a lasting peace in Europe was through a federation of states, which would 
help to counteract what Spinelli and his co-authors considered the destructive effects of 
 
2 The manifesto took its name from the Italian island of Ventotene, where the prison camp they were 
incarcerated was located.  
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nationalism. What separated this manifesto from the writings of earlier thinkers was that this 
was not just seen as an ideal, but the optimal solution for a post-war Europe. Spinelli would 
later be the founder of the Federalist Movement of Europe and would remain an influential 
character serving for instance as political advisor to the Italian prime minister Alcide de 
Gasperi (European Union, 2018).  
 
2.1.2 – Formalizing the Integration 
As the ideas of an integrated Europe had started to formalize prior to, and during the war, 
European integration was seen as the antidote to the extreme nationalism that had led to the 
devastating wars of the early 20th century. Even Winston Churchill spoke in favour of a 
United States of Europe in a speech from 1946 (Churchill, 1946). Several efforts were made 
to include many of the European countries as members in a future union, but eventually the 
six countries of France, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg 
created the ECSC. The idea behind this union was that as coal and steel were the two essential 
resources for waging war, tying these industries together would make a future continental war 
less likely. Although this was a step towards a more integrated Europe, it was still far below 
the ambitions of those who desired a federation of European states. Other European nation-
states were invited to join, but had their own reasons not to, like Finland, Austria and Sweden, 
who wished to remain neutral with regards to the Soviet Union (McCormick, 2011, p. 54).  
     The six ECSC countries decided to take further steps towards integration at a meeting in 
Messina, Italy in 1955. This meeting formed the starting point for an agreement towards 
developing common institutions, creating a common market, and even harmonizing a larger 
portfolio of social policies (McCormick, 2011, p. 54-55). This meeting led to further 
negotiations that in 1957 would culminate in the treaties of Rome; creating the European 
Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The 
administrative structure of the EEC consisted of a Commission, a Council of Ministers and a 
Court of Justice. In addition, there was a Parliamentary Assembly, which covered all the three 
communities (EEC, Euratom and ECSC). One of the motivations for this increased integration 
among the Six was the development in the east. The Soviet Union was considered a threat, 
and a closer integration economically was believed to strengthen the countries. In addition, 
there was little doubt that the Six were relying on the support of the US in the event of 
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aggression from the Soviet Union, and a strengthened integration would make them a stronger 
unit in negotiations with the US.  
 
2.1.3 – Expansions 
The way forward for the EEC was to expand its membership beyond the Six. However, not 
much enthusiasm was present among the other countries at this point, though they did 
understand the value of tighter integration of markets. Therefore, the European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) was created in 1960, which included the “outer Seven” (as opposed to 
the inner Six) of Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. This 
was not nearly as integrated and committing as the EEC. For instance, EFTA did not operate 
common external tariffs like the EEC, and the member states were free to negotiate these 
tariffs individually (Curzon, 1974, p. 104). The EEC member states had made impressive 
economic and political progress, and several of the outer Seven countries were eager to be a 
part of this prosperous union, especially British industry (McCormick, 2011, p. 56-57). Only a 
year later, four of the EFTA members, Britain, Ireland, Denmark and Norway3 decided to 
apply for membership in the EEC. However, despite early success in the negotiations, French 
President Charles de Gaulle vetoed the decision to proceed, as it clashed with his vision of the 
EEC based on a Franco-German axis. Furthermore, he was sceptical about Britain’s sudden 
interest, as they had mostly been absent from the integration movement of the 1950s, as well 
the prospect of the UK giving the US too much influence in the EEC. As the four countries 
applied together, these countries were rejected as well. Britain applied again in 1967 with the 
same result. When de Gaulle eventually retired as President in 1969, the four countries once 
again decided to apply for membership. Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the EEC in 
1973, whereas Norway did not, as its people marginally rejected it in a referendum the 
previous year (Norman, 1989, p. 453; Pettersen et al., 1996, p. 257).  
    In the years that followed, another country, namely Greece, joined the EEC. Greece had 
been an associate member since 1961, but due to a military coup in 1967, further plans of 
accession fell through. However, with the return to a democratically elected government in 
1974, they immediately applied for membership, eager to consolidate its fragile democracy. 
 
3 Norway joined the process a year later, in 1962. 
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Greece became a full member in 1981. With the fall of the undemocratic political regimes of 
Spain and Portugal in the mid-1970s, they eventually joined the EU as full members in 1986. 
This marked the end of the first wave of enlargements (Strielkowski & Höschle, 2013, p. 
618). 
 
2.1.4 - Tying the Knots 
Now, the European Community4 was abruptly becoming a substantial organization, with ever 
increasing influence. After the accessions of Spain and Portugal in 1986, it numbered 322 
million people, and accounted for more than one-fifth of world trade. There were many 
positives to draw on with regards to the economic integration and progress. However, 
politically, the development had challenges. It was still not considered a very representative 
organization with regards to directly representing the European citizens. The Community, and 
in particular the EC as well as the whole European project, was by some regarded as an elitist 
top-down project initiated and developed by national government leaders and technocrats in 
the EC (Best, et al., 2012; Pausch, 2014, p. 1-2). However, Andrew Moravcsik (2002, p. 621-
622) contests this claim, asserting that there is no evidence for a fundamental democratic 
deficit in the EU. The reason is that the decision-making processes in the EU do not diverge 
substantially from those of modern democracies. However, this issue of the democratic deficit 
has remained a vigorous academic and public debate over the years (see also below).  
     In addition to such democratic deficit concerns, there were also concerns about the 
functioning of the European Community’s single market. The common market’s further 
development was hindered by barriers to the free movement of people and capital, and other 
challenges linked with national differences in policy (McCormick, 2011, p. 59). Soon enough 
the controversial question was raised whether the single market could truly be completed 
without the creation of a monetary union. Consequently, this led the European leaders to 
launch two initiatives, namely the European Monetary System (EMS) and the Single 
European Act (SEA). The Euro and the EMS will be expanded upon in section 2.3.  
     The rational for the signing of the SEA was the concern that member states prioritized 
protecting the national economies with subsidies, and not the full extent of the European 
 
4 The EEC was by this time known as the European Community.  
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common market. Thus, it was considered necessary to fully reform the single market in order 
to stay competitive in world trade (particularly with regards to the recent economic growth of 
the United States and Japan) (Moravcsik, 1991, p. 23). The Act was signed in Luxembourg in 
1986 and was the first major change the treaties of the European Community since the Treaty 
of Rome of 1957. The main goal of the act was to remove barriers between the member states, 
such as physical barriers (customs and passport controls), fiscal barriers (related to taxation) 
and technical barriers (i.e. standards, laws, qualification) (Moravcsik, 1991, p. 19-20). As 
extensive as the SEA was, it did not encompass common European policy in areas such as 
immigration, visa and asylum. Open borders were dealt with in the Schengen Agreement of 
1985, where France, Germany and the Benelux signed early, and have in later years been 
joined by all member states in signing the agreement5, in addition to the remaining EFTA 
countries of Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland (Schutte, 1991, p. 549-50).  
     The SEA laid the groundwork for further integration within the Community and, with the 
fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 as well as the Soviet Union and the Iron Curtain in the early 
1990s, led the way for further development of the Community. Steps to further political 
integration were taken and culminated in the signing of the Treaty of the European Union6 in 
Maastricht in 1992. This major step towards a political union would – in addition to from now 
on being called the European Union (EU) – make it a more visible presence in the minds of 
the member state citizens (Moravcsik, 1991, p. 56). 
 
2.1.5 - Further Expansion and Present Standing 
Following the Maastricht Treaty, Austria, Finland and Sweden became members of the EU in 
1995, making all of Western-Europe (except the EFTA-countries of Iceland, Liechtenstein, 
Norway and Switzerland)7 a part of the EU. Following this expansion was a few years marked 
by the implementation of the Euro (more on this in section 2.2). After that, the EU 
experienced the largest expansion of the European project yet when ten new countries, 
 
5 The UK have excluded themselves from large parts of the agreement, due to them being an island nation-state. 
Ireland have followed the same path because of their previous passport agreement with the UK.  
6 Commonly known as the Maastricht Treaty. 
7 With exception of the latter, these countries became a part of the European Economic Area in 1994.  
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consisting of former Eastern Bloc countries, in addition to Malta and Cyprus, joined the EU. 
Up until this point, the EU had consisted of mostly wealthy west European countries. Now, 
however, many not so wealthy Eastern and Central European countries became a part of the 
Union and were promised a rapid rise in economic performance. This was also the first time 
former Soviet Union republics (the three Baltic states: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) would 
become a part of the EU. Despite the addition of ten countries, this was not a massive increase 
in terms of population or economy. The increase in population would only be around 20 per 
cent while all their combined economies would still be smaller that of the Netherlands. Three 
years later, they were joined by another two former Eastern Bloc countries, namely Bulgaria 
and Romania. Croatia became a full member in 2013, while countries such as Iceland8, 
Macedonia9, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey are/or have been candidates to the EU since the 
2004 expansion (European Commission, 2019b).  
     With its mass expansion since the 1990s, EU has been forced to evaluate its system, and 
potential reforms. A recurring theme is the need for more democracy within the system, in 
order to bring it closer to the citizens. A debate that has been prevalent in the later decades 
has been whether to go wider (enlarging the Union to include larger parts of Europe) or go 
deeper (increasing the scope and strength of the EU’s powers) (Kelemen et al., 2014, p. 647). 
While some scholars and EU leaders would claim that one does not have to exclude the other, 
others claim the feasibility of the two in unison could have dire consequences of flawed 
development, and situations where the EC and member state governments push through 
policy and enlargements without considering the outcomes (Haynes & Pinnock., 1998, p. 
424). However, followers of the ‘hand-in-hand’ approach defend this pursuit with the claim 
that widening can in fact facilitate deepening. This happens because widening can generate a 
legislative gridlock that increases the room for manoeuvre for supranational organizations 
such as the EC, and they can exploit their discretion to pursue their preferences for deeper 
integration. In addition, widening creates functional pressures for institutional reform that 
eventually facilitates deepening (Kelemen et al., 2014, p. 648-49). Therefore, it might not be 
so outlandish that the EC has been pushing for further widening.  
 
8 Iceland revoked its candidacy in March 2015 and is no longer considered an EU Candidate Country. 
9 Since February 2019, Macedonia is formally known as the Republic of North Macedonia, in order to 




2.1.6 – The European Commission 
The EC was founded by the Paris Treaty of 1951, and was at that point known as the ‘High 
Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community’. It was initially led by one of the EU’s 
founding fathers, Jean Monnet, from 1952-57. In the first few years its role was mostly 
administrative and co-ordinational, but with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 its influence grew, in 
addition to being named the Commission (of the EEC). France would initially be skeptical of 
the powers of this organization, as it was designed to be an independent institution. As the 
Commissioners would not officially serve the interest of their state, but the common good of 
the EEC and its member states, France would much rather see that the Council had 
proportionally greater powers. However, other member states such as Germany viewed it as 
crucial to have an organization that focused on the greater purpose of increased economic 
prosperity across the countries (Hooghe, 2001, p. 6). The incoming President of the 
Commission in 1957, Walter Hallstein, envisioned a Commission that would have power and 
influence, and have a strict hierarchical administration, in addition to full independence from 
the member states.  
     During the post-Hallstein years, the EC would remain a rather quiet and uncontroversial 
institution within the EEC. It was not until the ascent of Jacques Delors in the mid-1980s that 
the Commission would take the center stage. Delors would make sure that the Commission 
was a driving force in the European project, and not just a facilitator and administrative 
organizer. As will be expanded upon in section 2.2, one instance where the EC would take 
this role of driving force was when the monetary union became a serious topic. The EC 
needed a project where its expertise and leadership would be needed, and the Euro project had 
the potential to become that. The Commission would continue to increase its influence and 
power over the years in the form of increased powers to the President, culminating in the 
Commissions of Barrosso (2004-2014) and Juncker (2014-2019). These developments 
reflected the hierarchical ambitions of Hallstein (Hooghe, 2001, p. 8).  
     Today, the political leadership of the EU is composed of 27 Commissioners (one from 
each country), led by the Commission President, who decides which policy area each 
individual Commissioner is responsible for. At the beginning of every new Commission term, 
which is every five years, the president determines the political priorities of the upcoming 
term of office.  These priorities are further turned into concrete actions on a yearly basis 
through an annual work programme. The everyday running of Commission is conducted by 
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its staff, who are organized into Directorates-General (DGs), each of whom is responsible for 
one specific policy area. The DGs are led by a Director-General who reports to a 
Commissioner. Examples of such DGs are Economic and Financial Affairs (ECFIN), 
European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (NEAR) and Research and 
Innovation (RTD). As of early 2020, there are 33 such DGs. In addition, there are six 
executive agencies, and 15 service departments, totaling 52 departments and agencies 
(European Commission, 2019a). Thus, the EC has developed into a sizeable institution, with a 
total staff of 32 000 people.  
      The role of the EC today is to act as the executive branch of the EU. It proposes 
legislation, manages EU policies and allocates EU funding, enforces EU law, and represents 
the EU internationally (European Commission, 2019a). Until the signing of the Lisbon Treaty 
in 2009, the EC shared the executive role with the Council, which officially held both 
legislative and executive powers. However, as the different Commissioners sit for five years 
at a time, and the Council presidency rotates between countries for six months at a time, the 
consistency and influence of the EC in terms of policy propositions can be considered to be 
greater. EU regulation and directives are customarily adopted through a legislative procedure 
called ordinary legislative procedure (OLP). OLP is ordinarily conducted in four steps 
(European Parliament, 2019, p. 11-24). 
1) The EC submits a proposal to the Council and the Parliament.  
2) The Council and the Parliament adopt a legislative proposal either at the first 
reading or at the second reading,  
3) If the two institutions do not reach an agreement after the second reading 
conciliation committee is convened. 
4) If the text agreed by the conciliation committee is acceptable to both institutions at 
the third reading, the legislative act is adopted.  
As the EC holds the ‘right of initiative’ in OLP, which is manifested by Article 17 in the 
Treaties of the European Union (TEU), the notion that the EC is the chief executive institution 
in the EU is further strengthened (European Parliament, 2019, p. 11). Legislative initiative 
can according to the treaties in certain cases be submitted from a group of member states, on 
recommendation from the ECB, or at the request of the Court of Justice (ECJ). However, the 
vast majority of proposals are submitted by the EC. Therefore, a key part of the ECs day-to-
day agenda is about formulation of legislative proposals. 
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     Since a close relationship to the different member states is important for the EC to uphold 
its influence, the EC cultivates member state relationships using several different approaches. 
The most central ones are direct relations with individual member states, as well as attending 
European Council10 meetings. The latter is attended by the President of the EC and the High 
Representative11, in addition to the heads of states or governments, as well as the President of 
the European Council. This is important, as the EC thus is present at the summits where key 
European issues are discussed, and thereby maintains a solid amount of influence. 
     Hence, the EC is a very central institution within the EU and has developed into a sturdy 
executive organization, and has during the years substantially increased its influence. It is 
now, in practice, the only EU institution that has the right of initiative and has assumed a 
leading role in foreign affairs. As I will discuss in more detail in Chapter 3, this justifies my 
focus on this institution in my empirical analysis.  
 
2.2 – The Euro 
In order to understand how the debt crisis could take place, it is vital to get a basic 
understanding of the Euro and what the motivations for its implementation were. In addition, 
the leading role the EC had in its inception is important, as they can be argued to have a 
responsibility for many of the misconstructions of the Euro and might thus partly be held 
accountable for the crisis that would emerge. 
 
2.2.1 – Initial Stages 
The idea of a monetary union was not an entirely new concept prior to the Euro. There were 
monetary unions in Europe in the nineteenth century, for instance the Latin Monetary Union12 
of 1865, and the Scandinavian Monetary Union of 1872 (Pisani-Ferry, 2014, p. 19). These 
were based on metallic currencies and were dissolved in the 1920s. Other examples are 
former empires that used a common currency and where the currency outlived the empire, 
like the Austro-Hungarian crown and the Soviet Union rouble. These did however not last for 
 
10 Not to be confused with the Council (of the European Union). 
11 Official title: High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 
12 Comprised the countries of France, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland and Greece. 
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long. In fact, the Euro is the sole transnational currency issued and managed by a single 
common institution. While the idea of a common currency had floated since the beginning of 
the European project, it was not until the late 1980s that the idea manifested into a concrete 
plan, led by the European Commission president Jacques Delors. The idea of a common 
currency was considered the logical next step after already establishing a customs union, a 
common trade policy, and a common competition policy. In addition, regulatory barriers to 
trade within the EU were abolished, and a single market for goods, services and capital was in 
the process of implementation (1986-1993) (Pisani-Ferry, 2014, p. 20; Marsh, 2011, p. 14). 
While other initiatives of the EU have come at a cost of sovereignty for the member states, 
there has probably not been a more ambitious and radical proposal with regards to 
concessions of sovereignty than that of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Sandbu, 
2017, p. 2).  
     One of the main motivations for pursuing a monetary union was the general dissatisfaction 
with the new system of floating exchange rates among European countries. France and 
Germany (and most of Continental Europe) were particularly negatively disposed to it. In 
their view, the prevailing system encouraged speculation and distortion, which conflicted with 
proper economic management and increasing welfare (Marsh, 2011, p. 14-15). Furthermore, 
the European stance was that the current system of fluctuating currencies eventually would 
lead to economic and political disorder, drawing on the lessons of the turbulent 1920s and 
1930s. Therefore, the European countries had contributed in attempts to stabilize exchange 
rates globally and regionally following the Second World War, which culminated in exchange 
rate arrangements in the 1970s, most notably the European Monetary System (EMS) (Pisani-
Ferry, 2014, p. 23). The goal of the EMS was to link the currencies among the core EC 
members in order to prevent large fluctuations relative to one another (Marsh, 2011, p. 15). In 
1978 eight out of the nine13 current EC members decided to join the Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM) of the EMS, in many ways launching the long journey towards a common 
currency.  
     Eventually, the 1980s proved to be an era of increasingly volatile currency upsets, and the 
EMS would become gradually more dominated by the German mark (D-mark) as the EMS 
‘anchor-currency’. This was due to the growing strength of the German economy in addition 
 
13 The UK decided against joining in 1978. They did join in 1990, only to leave once more in 1992. 
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to its steadfast and independent Bundesbank (Marsh, 2011, p. 15). With time, the European 
governments came to realise that the EMS system of fixed exchange rates was unfeasible in 
the long run, and the only way to truly avoid future exchange rate wavering was to eradicate 
all national currencies and generate a completely new common currency. 
 
2.2.2 – From the ERM to the Euro 
As many European countries by the late 1980s effectively already had given up their 
monetary autonomy to the Germans and the Bundesbank, the new European Central Bank 
was created to partly imitate the Bundesbank. Initially it would be France (through president 
François Mitterrand) that was one of the driving forces for the monetary project. This was 
because he had left his ambitious and radical idea of social transformation in France in the 
1980s, and in his second term decided to let European integration take centre stage. This was 
both a pragmatic and idealistic manoeuvre. He was a firm believer in a unified Europe, but 
also saw a more integrated Europe as an arena where France could control the Germans 
(Pisani-Ferry. 2014, p. 25). In addition, it was an opportunity to end the franc’s status as an 
inferior currency to the stable D-mark. For the newly joined member states of Greece, Spain 
and Portugal, the motivation to take part in the monetary unification was linked to leaving 
behind the days of feeble growth in productivity, cycles of inflation and depreciation, and 
finally catch up economically with the rest. Such a drastic move would benefit their status as 
prosperous, modern, and stable democracies (Sandbu, 2017, p. 13).  
     By the early 1990s, Mitterrand was not alone in working for a more unified Europe, and 
other national leaders, most notably German chancellor Helmut Kohl, where also open to 
further integration. However, incentives to get the project rolling were needed, and German 
reunification proved to be the push they required. German reunification would have a 
substantial impact on the entire Union, and Kohl was ready to speed the process up by 
showing his commitment to the process of integration. And thus, much was done. At least 
politically. Monetarily, the Germans also wanted increased economic firmness within the 
single market, and a shelter from fluctuating exchange rates (Sandbu, 2017, p. 13).  
     The design of the Euro was mostly being handled by economists and technocrats under 
Jacques Delors’ leadership. A key aspect in the design of the new ECB, which it also 
inherited from its inspiration the Bundesbank, was the complete independence from political 
control, and the task of keeping inflation low and stable, at around 2 per cent (Dyson, 2010, p. 
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603). This was a condition set by the Germans, in order to keep domestic tensions at bay. The 
French were not very excited by these conditions, but the prospect of a less volatile exchange 
rate and a stable inflation rate, was something that many member states could like (Sandbu, 
2017, p. 16). The anticipation was that this would increase productivity in all the member 
states in the long run, thus creating a stronger competitive advantage for the European 
economies on the global economic stage (Sandbu, 2017, p. 16-17). 
      One major concern for the Euro’s founders was that there would be a large risk attached to 
the fact that all the national governments controlled their own fiscal deficit and debt, without 
any supranational instrument to chastise those who disobeyed the criteria. Such uncoordinated 
fiscal policy leads to the probable outcome that national governments will not be overly 
concerned about how their budget will affect other member states (Dyson, 2010, p. 604). A 
response from the Commission was that a principle of solidarity and joint responsibility 
among the member states should not be ruled out, possibly foreshadowing the events of the 
2010s. The prospect of bailouts was not unheard of, and a severe concern for the Germans, as 
they expected they would be the main contributors in such an event. The Maastricht Treaty 
accommodated such concerns with some formal demands for future members of the EMU. 
This would be known as the ‘stability and growth pact’ (SGP). The rules of entry to the Euro 
included a ceiling of 3 per cent deficits, and public debt under 60 per cent of national income 
(Sandbu, 2017, p. 19). These rules would in the end not be too strictly upheld, as Belgium, 
Italy and Greece all were admitted with debt levels well beyond the 60 per cent limit. Greece 
barely made it past the deficit limit due to some leniency and creative calculation. In the years 
leading up the implementation of the Euro, many economies did show signs of developing 
more balanced budgets, with reductions in deficits, decreasing public debts and stabilizing 
inflation in countries that had such struggles in the past. This effect pleased the markets, and 
many investors would be quick to deem the project a success. However, some of this praise 
would prove rather hasty.  
 
2.3 – Crises Emerge 
The two crises of the late 2000s and early 2010s would have a devastating effect on the EU 
member states and the EC as an organization. The financial crisis of 2007-2008 would 
initially strike the hardest in the United States. Yet, it would have ramifications on a global 
scale, including in the EU. In order to understand the Eurozone debt crisis, it is vital to grasp 
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what happened across the Atlantic in the years prior. One can question whether a crisis would 
have struck in the Eurozone sooner or later, but it is clear that the financial crisis sped up that 
process. In addition, the role the EC (together with the rest of the Troika) played is vital to 
understand. They made many choices that would have an instrumental effect on the affected 
countries, in addition to the whole Euro area and the Union in general. 
 
2.3.1 – American Apprehension 
As American banks began to collapse during 2007 and 2008, it was clear that something 
deeper was afoot. This would prove not to be just an ordinary recession and a general 
business cycle decline. When even giant corporations like the investment bank Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy, and other colossuses like Bear Sterns and Merrill Lynch had to 
be acquisitioned and sold, respectively, the mood changed from severely concerned to 
widespread panic. The effects of the crisis would have global impact. IMF reported that 91 
economies, which represented two-thirds of the global domestic product in purchasing-power 
parity, experienced a decline in output in 2009. This constitutes the largest negative shock in 
the post-war era (Wolf, 2018a) – until the current Corona-crisis.  
     Initially the countries that suffered the toughest hits were western economies, particularly 
those with powerful banking sectors. However, it would not take much time before emerging 
economies would feel the heat, ultimately almost being affected to the levels of the western 
economies. One of the main direct explanations of the global decrease in output would be 
attributed to the low levels of investment (Wolf, 2018a). This had a tremendously negative 
impact on many EU and Eurozone countries, where countries like Greece and Ireland where 
hit especially hard (Ball, 2015). This in turn set the stage for the European debt crisis, which 
will be discussed in the next part.  
 
2.3.2 – European Emergency 
In November 2009 it became evident that the deficit of the Greek government budget in fact 
was twice what Greek government had previously presented. These harrowing revelations led 
to Greece no longer being able to borrow money in the international financial markets, which 
again led the Commission, the ECB and the IMF to initiate a program of financial help 
backed by an ‘economic adjustment programme’. This meant Greece could borrow 
indispensable liquid assets in order to pay off debt and disburse public wages, but in turn had 
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to abide by the rules set by the so-called Troika. They required extensive structural reforms 
and financial retrenchment. The immediate effect of this was that the deficit was severely 
reduced. However, the financial retrenchments (for instance public sector cuts) inevitably 
would reinforce the economic decline, eventually causing the unemployment rate to exceed 
25 per cent (Pisani-Ferry, 2014, p. 85). However, the debt would only increase, and the 
prospect of Greece being able to repay its debt seemed ever more unlikely. The country 
appeared to be practically insolvent and was shut out of the bond markets. To add to the 
misery, a decade of large-scale wage and price increase had severely deteriorated Greek 
competitiveness, something that further complicated the matter of getting the economy back 
on track (Pisani-Ferry, 2014, p. 87-88).  
     For many independent economists, classic solutions, like devaluation, would make the 
most sense to improve competitiveness. This was however unfeasible, as the Greeks were 
unable to adjust the common currency, and a devaluation would impact all other Eurozone 
member states. Thus, there was no optimal solution. One basically had to pick the least 
painful one. For the Germans, debt restructuring was the only viable solution. For France and 
the ECB, this was still a detested choice, which led to heated debates during the core phase of 
the crisis (Pisani-Ferry, 2014, p. 88-89). As time went, a compromise was developed that no 
one and everyone could live with. In October 2010 at Deauville in Normandy, France and 
Germany came to an agreement that ten days later would get the support of the remaining 
national governments and lead to the creation of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). 
The ESM was fully operational in 2012 and would become the Eurozone’s lending arm.  
     It was not until July 2011 that European leaders realised something had to be done quickly, 
and they agreed to reduce Greek debt by 21%, which eventually would prove insufficient. 
Ultimately, half of the Greek’s government’s debt was removed. By mid-2011 not only 
Greece was on IMF-EU assistance programmes, but Ireland and Portugal as well, something 
that lead many European leaders to believe the worst days of the crisis were behind them. 
However, this temporary calm proved to be one before a storm. It would soon be evident that 
Italy was having great problems, and that the crisis had reached them as well. To make 
matters worse, fears were beginning to spread about Spain, which had a sizeable property 
bubble and its banks had accumulated many bad loans. As the crisis returned in force in the 
autumn of 2011 it became evident that global investors were reluctant to invest in southern 
Europe, and increasingly so in the rest of the Euro area (Pisani-Ferry, 2014, p. 12). This lead 
the new head of the IMF, Christine Lagarde, to express the urgent need of recapitalization in 
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the Euro area. The gloomy prospect of Spain and Italy needing the same level of assistance as 
Greece, would make European leaders, as well as the Global economy, tremble. They 
represented 11 per cent and 17 per cent, respectively, of the Euro area GDP. A potential 
Spanish-Italian Euro exit would more than likely mean the end of the monetary project. This 
prospect would alert who were yet to realise the perils. Too much prestige was attached to 
this. In the eyes of the Euro-area leaders, the Euro simply could not fail (Pisani-Ferry, 2014, 
p. 12-13). 
 
2.3.3 – The Crisis Response 
A key part of the EC’s (and the Troika’s) response to the debt crisis has been the 
implementation of so-called austerity measures. Austerity is defined by Mark Blyth (2013) as 
“the deliberate deflation of domestic wages and prices through cuts to public spending”. Thus, 
in addition to reducing the state’s debt and deficit, the intended long-term effect of these 
policies is to increase economic competitiveness and restore what advocates of such policies 
would refer to as “business confidence”. In the view of the “austerians”14, cuts in public 
spending will lead to private investment, as they can be assured that the market will not be 
crowded out by governmental stimulus efforts. Due to this, the proposed effect is that 
consumers and producers will become confident about future prospects, thus spending more, 
consequently helping the economy back to growth (Blyth, 2013; Dymski, 2019, p. 671). The 
term austerity is often applied by adversaries of such policies, while advocates put more 
emphasis on terms like fiscal consolidation and fiscal adjustment (Alesina & Ardagna, 2009, 
p. 8-9). As austerity is the most commonly used term to describe such means of financial 
restructuring, it will be the preferred term in this thesis.  
     The concept of austerity dates back centuries to British political and economist theorists 
such as John Locke, David Hume and Adam Smith (Blyth, 2013). Hume and Smith concluded 
that government debt would be poisonous to the economy in the long run, and thus had to be 
avoided, despite its appeal as a short-term funding mechanism for the state (Blyth, 2013). 
Throughout the nineteenth century British liberal thinkers started approaching the issue of 
governmental debt in two different ways. One of these was economist David Ricardo whose 
 
14 A term coined the American economist Rob Parenteau to describe advocates of austerity policies. 
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solution was to exclude the state from getting involved in the economy, as the state’s 
intervention would only be counterproductive to a market that would regulate itself. The other 
approach was the one of John Stuart Mill, who argued that government debt would not 
necessarily lead to a country going bankrupt and may well even be used to fund various social 
investments. Today, two famous representatives of each view are non-interventionist 
Friedrich Hayek and the proponent of state spending John Maynard Keynes (Skidelsky, 2006, 
p. 87-88).  
      In order to understand why the Germans have been such proponents of austerity, one must 
understand how its economy differs from other economies. First, the economic growth of 
Germany has always been export-led, and after the devastations of the Second World War the 
Germans prioritized rebuilding their capital stock (thus keeping a lid on domestic 
consumption), and recover export markets (which meant keeping costs, and thus wages, low) 
(Blyth, 2013). Between 1950 and 1959 the German GDP grew by almost 8% per year, a 
sensation known as the “Wirtschaftswunder” (The Economic Miracle), and by the early 1960s 
Germany had restored its position as the largest economic power in Europe (Eichengreen & 
Ritschl, 2009, p. 191-192). By looking at Germany’s explosive growth, there is no wonder 
that many would want to copy the German approach. A stable, low inflation, competitive 
industry would tempt many a nation-state.  
     So, would the German austerity model be suitable for other economies? For certain 
economies, yes. According to Blythe (2013), this is most suited for supply-side, export-led 
economies, with strong monetary authority, in addition to having very competitive product 
(Blyth, 2013; Krugman 2012). However, due to basic logic, this can obviously not work for 
every single country. Not every country can run a surplus, and for one country to run a 
surplus another has to run a deficit. Hence, with regards to applying austerity for the entire 
Eurozone, this is according to Wolf (2014) not a realistic scenario, especially since many 
other of the industrialized Asian countries are running surpluses. Had the Eurozone been a 
small monetary union of export-led, highly competitive member states, success might have 
been possible. Yet, the composition of the Eurozone is not based on these criteria, and the 19 




2.4 – Legitimacy Issues 
Over the years, critical voices have raised questions over the EC’s (and the EU’s) legitimacy 
and democratic deficit (Thomassen & Schmitt, 1999, p. 4-5; Tsakatika, 2005, p. 194). 
Especially in the years following the Maastricht Treaty, there has been a stronger focus on 
whether or not the EC can be considered to be a legitimate organization, seeing as it has such 
an influence on policy affecting millions of European citizens. So, who does the EC draw its 
legitimacy from? A nation-state would draw its legitimacy from its people through elections, 
which would be formulated in a constitution (Hirst & Thompson, 1995, p. 76-77). In terms of 
where the EC draws its legitimacy, the European Union does not have a proper constitution. 
While one was developed and presented to voters in the member states, it was rejected in 
France and the Netherlands.15 This was a great setback for the integration process, and 
opposition to the perceived elite project (known as Euroscepticism) was becoming more 
widespread on the continent (Hooghe & Marks, p. 120). Some of this could potentially be 
explained due to misinformation about the scale and the role of the EU, while some of it could 
simply be due to legitimate disagreement about the principles of for instance the common 
market.  
     In order to understand some of the legitimacy issues the EC has faced over the years, a 
plunge into the existing literature on the topic is required. While this section briefly discusses 
legitimacy issues directly relating to the EC, a general discussion of legitimacy and 
organizational legitimacy follows in section 3.1 of the next chapter.  
     The main literature on the legitimacy of the Commission is based around distinct types of 
legitimacy, namely input legitimacy (Scharpf, 2003, p. 2), output legitimacy (Scharpf, 2003, 
p. 2) and throughput legitimacy (Schmidt, 2013, p. 2-3). The most well-known of the three is 
input legitimacy. This can be considered legitimacy through participation and builds on the 
notion of politics and governance by the people. Increase in input legitimacy can be achieved 
if more people are able to take part in the decision-making process, through for instance 
elections or referenda. The second type, output legitimacy, applies to the legitimacy of the 
outcomes, and assesses whether the performance of the organization contributes to its 
 
15 However, other treaties like the Treaty of Nice (signed in 2001, in force by 2003) and the Treaty of Lisbon 
(signed in 2007, in force since 2009) have subsequently served as de facto constitutions for Europe (Binzer 
Hobolt & Brouard, 2011, p. 309). 
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legitimation. In this case, legitimacy is increased if more people (of those governed) benefit 
from the actions of the organization. An organization such as the EC should ideally have high 
levels of both input and output legitimacy, but in the event the former is lacking, it can 
compensate by performing to a satisfactory standard in the eyes of the stakeholders (the 
governed), by for instance introducing policy that will benefit large portions of the 
population. A third type of legitimacy is throughput legitimacy, which focuses on the political 
process that shapes how decisions are made. This looks at the procedures of decision-making 
within the organization, as well as covering the degree of its transparency. This includes how 
the organization is scrutinized by the other institutions, such as the Council, Parliament and 
the ECJ. As noted by Schmidt (2013, p. 32), having maximum levels of all three types of 
legitimacy is not feasible, as too much input legitimacy can diminish the efficiency of the 
political process, while excess levels of output legitimacy can disenfranchise minority groups 
not positively affected by policy that benefits the majority.  
      Since the full implementation of the Euro in 2002, the EU and EC have had its fair share 
of challenges. These include the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, the subsequent debt 
crisis in the Eurozone, the migrant crisis beginning in 2015, and the United Kingdom’s 
withdrawal from the European Union. These incidents have taken a prominent position on the 
EC’s agenda for more than a decade and one could argue that this has pushed other important 
reforms and policies to the backbenches, at least in terms of media attention and general focus 
in the public. While some have criticized the EC for being a rather weak organization (in 
terms of actually achieving breakthroughs), others have criticized the EC for being an 
organization that is comprised of very pro-integration staff and having little room for 
employees that have different views. Thus, it may not be very representative of the citizens it 
is supposed to represent, as the support for further integration is more mixed among the 
citizens (Hooghe, 2001, p. 24-25). This is important since such representation has been linked 
in much academic research to issues of legitimacy (Gravier, 2013; Meier & Capers, 2013). 
     Today, critical voices remain, and significantly so, among citizens and prominent 
European political parties. The question therefore is whether the EC has legitimacy as 
organization, which is a necessity for it to continue evolving into what the founding fathers 
envisioned. This is the question I will ask with regards to the debt crisis: i.e. how this crisis 
affected the legitimacy of the EC. If the results would indicate that the EC as the ‘face’ of the 
EU has lost legitimacy due to this crisis, this can have profound implications for its 
functioning and ability to instigate major reforms. This question of legitimacy will be further 
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Chapter 3 - Theoretical framework 
Research on the legitimacy of the European Union and the European Commission is a well-
established field of research, and there is a great deal of existing literature on the topic (see 
also Chapter 2). In this section, I will define – and review literature on – key concepts for my 
master thesis such as legitimacy and legitimacy crises. I will then discuss Hamilton’s (2006) 
theoretical model of organizational legitimacy underlying my empirical analysis and apply it 
to the EU and the Commission. 
  
3.1 – Literature Review 
As I am studying whether the EC is suffering from a legitimacy crisis following the European 
debt crisis, the definition of legitimacy is important. In his article ‘Managing Legitimacy: 
Strategic and Institutional Approaches’, Mark C. Suchman (1995:573) points out that 
legitimacy often is discussed, but to a lesser degree described, and to an even lesser degree 
defined. He further points out that many of the definitions that do exist are focusing too much 
on the cognitive rather than the evaluative side of legitimacy. In his own broad-based 
definition, he incorporates the cognitive and the evaluative dimensions, in addition to 
explicitly acknowledging “the role of the social audience legitimation dynamics” (Suchman, 
1995:573). Legitimacy is defined by Suchman (1995:573) as a “generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions”. In short, in order to be 
considered legitimate, the entity’s (or organization’s) actions must be considered acceptable, 
to the standard of what its relevant publics deem as acceptable behavior (Franck, 1990:24; 
Hurd, 1999:387-388; Stephen, 2018:99). Thus, with regard to IOs, as the principles and 
structures of the IO must be in line with social beliefs, its legitimacy is bound by the beliefs of 
both its internal participants and external constituents (Hurd, 1999:388; Stephen, 2018:99). It 
is argued that IOs are more powerful when they have legitimacy. They do, however, need to 
adapt to the demands of their audiences in order to retain it (Cox, 1983:172; Hurd, 2007:128-
31; Stephen, 2018:99-100). As Buchanan & Keohane (2006:407) state it “[t]he perception of 
legitimacy matters, because, in a democratic era, multilateral institutions will only thrive if 
they are viewed as legitimate by democratic publics.” 
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     The field of legitimacy crises has its origins from Jürgen Habermas’ Legitimation Crisis 
(1975:46), where he divides political crises into an input crisis (legitimacy) and an output 
crisis (rationality crisis). A legitimacy crisis occurs if the legitimizing administrative system 
“… does not succeed in maintaining the requisite level of mass loyalty …” (Habermas, 
1975:46). In his view, a legitimacy crisis is a prolonged rationality crisis. A rationality crisis 
occurs when decision makers are no longer able to produce the outcomes that are expected of 
them. This then leads to a legitimacy crisis, where followers revoke support and loyalty to the 
decision makers and replace it with questioning the current social structure and institutions 
(Habermas, 1975:46-47; Pearson & Clair, 1998:64). If this happens, the audience and the 
stakeholders become ungovernable, and the organization will no longer have meaningful 
control over events (O’Connor, 1987:106-107; Pearson & Clair, 1998:64).  
 
3.2 - Hamilton’s Model 
In her article (2006), Hamilton develops a theoretical model that aims to define, delineate and 
characterize organizations’ loss of legitimacy. Within this model, she more specifically 
develops four propositions about what it means for an organization to lose legitimacy. These 
propositions are: Management inability to maneuver (P1), severing of external ties (P2), 
disruption of critical resource flow (P3), and tainting of organizational reputation (P4). This 
section sets out these four propositions, which will in the next section be applied to IOs as a 
theoretical basis to address my Research Question.  
 
The first proposition (P1) states that “organizational loss of legitimacy will impair 
management’s ability to maneuver in terms of defending, repairing or maintaining the 
organization’s viability” (Hamilton, 2006:334). If the organization’s management is 
struggling to respond to societal expectations, this will contribute to an organization’s loss of 
legitimacy. If the organization leadership is not able to meet the performance expectations of 
societal actors, they will not give their future support (Ashfort & Gibbs, 1990:178). If the 
management is limited, for instance due to increased scrutiny (i.e. after a crisis, such as the 
debt crisis) it may experience weakened flexibility in its ability to respond to this and may 
feel that its hands are tied. Due to their weakened ability to respond to a crisis, management 
may choose to defend the status quo, by for instance denying the problem, rather than trying 
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to solve the problem, or making the necessary reforms (Hamilton, 2006:345).  
     The second proposition (P2) states that “organizational loss of legitimacy will sever an 
organization’s external ties” (Hamilton, 2006:334). An organization is conferred or attributed 
legitimacy by its audience, which means there is a relationship between the organization and 
its audience, rather than legitimacy simply being in the organization’s possession (Hamilton, 
2006:334). In plain language, this would mean that the organization’s loss of legitimacy 
would imply decreasing support from its audience. Other previously loyal allies could 
potentially distance themselves from the organization to avoid suffering from reduced status 
themselves, or “guilt by association”. This negative contagion could lead the organization to 
be excluded or even scorned by other previously allied organizations. 
     The third proposition (P3) states that “Organizational loss of legitimacy will disrupt an 
organization’s critical resource flows” (Hamilton, 2006:334). Legitimacy is seen as essential 
for organizations to be able to bring in resources like capital and personnel (Hamilton, 2006: 
334). Legitimacy affects the organizational audience’s conduct towards the organization. 
These organizational audiences are assumed to prefer supplying resources to trustworthy 
organizations, rather than undesirable and dishonored organizations. 
     The fourth proposition (P4) states that “Organizational loss of legitimacy will taint an 
organization’s reputation” (Hamilton, 2006:335). According to the literature, “legitimacy 
serves as a prerequisite to reputation”, and that organizational reputation is a socially 
constructed outcome of an organization’s legitimation process (Rao, 1994:30; Zyglidopoulos, 
2003:70; Hamilton, 2006:334). The reputation of an organization is a good indicator of 
aggregate perceptions and judgments of the citizens toward the organization. Both legitimacy 
and reputation are linked to “stakeholders’ thoughts and feelings about organizations”. 
However, these two constructs are considered separate (Hamilton, 2006:335). Legitimacy is 
linked to “acceptability” of the values and actions of the organization, while reputation is 
linked to “favorability” of organizations compared to competition and peers. This means that 
organizations need to adhere to the norms of social acceptability, before an organization’s 
action can be considered favorable, and thus be considered legitimate. In other words, the 




3.3 - Application of the Model 
The propositions from Hamilton look at several aspects of organizational loss of legitimacy 
and allows me to examine whether or not an organization has legitimacy. The model has 
proven to be effective in a private-sector setting. However, to the best of my knowledge, this 
model has not been previously applied to examine loss of legitimacy in a public organization 
such as the EC. From this perspective, it is important to note that Hamilton’s model is not 
created specifically for private organizations, but consistently relies on a more general 
language. The model is based on general organizational legitimacy literature. Therefore, I 
anticipate that Hamilton’s model will be applicable to an organization such as the EC. In this 
section, I will examine each proposition and assess whether it can be applied to not only 
private organizations, but also other types of public institutions or organizations. Furthermore, 
I will discuss whether they more specifically are applicable to the EC.  
     In addition to verifying the model’s applicability to public organizations, I will also 
propose to restate part of Hamilton’s model. In her model, the four propositions brought 
forward in the previous section describe what can be expected to happen when an 
organization loses legitimacy. Her model does not propose a causal relationship (i.e. loss of 
legitimacy causing specific outcomes), but instead highlights consistent patterns in the 
relationship between legitimacy loss and the characteristics included in the four propositions. 
Hence, I suggest that the model can be read in both directions. That is, the propositions can be 
utilized to describe both the consequences of loss of legitimacy (Hamilton’s model) and to 
indicate the characteristics that signify the presence of a loss of legitimacy (my model). I will 
expand on this at the end of this section.   
      
Proposition 1: Organizational loss of legitimacy will impair management’s ability to 
maneuver in terms of defending, repairing or maintaining the organization’s viability. The 
language in this proposition is general. Hence, it could be applied to public organizations as 
well as private ones. Similar to private organizations, public organizations have a hierarchical 
management structure, and this management is – like in private organizations – responsible 
for the organizations’ viability over time (Kaufman, 1976:9; Barnett & Finnemore, 2004:2-3). 
As such, the role of management is similar in at least some characteristics across private 
organizations and public organizations, which suggests that this proposition is applicable to 




Proposition 2: Organizational loss of legitimacy will sever an organization’s external ties. 
This proposition is also general in character. Nothing in the proposition’s definition would 
apply only to private companies. Public organizations also have external ties, allies and 
partners, who could be hesitant to offer support when the organization in question is suffering 
from loss of legitimacy (Hamilton, 2006:334; Ashfort & Gibbs:180). The issue of “guilt by 
association” could prove to be potentially damaging for public organizations’ partners or 
allies as well, if they for instance utter public support. If the organization in question is 
experiencing loss of legitimacy, partners or allies might choose to remain silent, or even 
become critical themselves, to avoid any spill-over effects (Hamilton, 2006:334; Suchman, 
1995:574). Thus, if in case of the EC close global partners like the IMF would distance 
themselves, this would be an indication of a loss of legitimacy. 
 
Proposition 3: Organizational loss of legitimacy will disrupt an organization’s critical 
resource flows. This proposition is also general in character, as there is nothing here that 
could limit the proposition’s applicability to private companies. A public organization is also 
dependent on resources, both personnel and capital (Rao, 1994:29; Suchman, 1995:574-575). 
For instance, the EC is dependent on highly skilled administrative staff, and lack of qualified 
applicants for these positions could hurt both the performance – and the legitimacy – of the 
EC (Gray, 2018:5). Although these resources might be acquired from different sources than 
private organizations, that is not specified in the proposition and so I find it to be fully 
applicable to a public organization.  
 
Proposition 4: Organizational loss of legitimacy will taint an organization’s reputation. The 
language in the proposition by itself is general enough to be applicable for all types of 
organizations. Relating this proposition to the EU setting, EU citizens can be referred to as the 
organization’s stakeholders, and they are the ones the EU – and, in turn, the EC – needs 
legitimacy from (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990:241; Hamilton, 2006:334-335). The EU is 
directly – and indirectly – accountable to citizens through the European Parliament and 
elected member state governments (who propose their Commissioners) (McCormick, 
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2011:88). Therefore, I would argue that it is of crucial importance for the EC – and any 
organization – to have an untainted reputation among its citizens.  
 
Based on my arguments above, I suggest a restated model, based on Hamilton’s:  
 
 
  FIGURE 1 - THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A CRISIS AND ORGANIZATIONAL LOSS OF 
LEGITIMACY 
 
Figure 1 shows the proposed relationship between a crisis and an organization’s – in this case 
the EC – loss of legitimacy. Note, however, that this model again does not aim to depict a 
causal relationship. Rather, it depicts a proposed set of connections between a crisis and 
organizational loss of legitimacy. The main idea is that a crisis may affect any – or all – of the 
characteristics described in the four propositions. If more of these elements become weakened 
under a crisis affecting the organization (e.g., more limited possibility to maneuver, reduced 
resource flows, tainted reputation,…), then in line with Hamilton’s (2006) argumentation this 
offers more indications that there is indeed a loss of legitimacy suffered by the organization at 
hand. In other words, my model suggests that if the data is consistent with what the 




3.4 - Operationalization of the Propositions 
As I have argued that each proposition is general enough to be applied to a public 
organization, the next phase will be to operationalize each proposition. This is particularly 
important, as I will be dependent on these operationalizations in finding empirical data for 
measuring each proposition (P1-P4). 
 
3.4.1 - P1: Management Maneuver 
How can management’s inability to maneuver be measured? This question requires two 
aspects to be addressed: a) Identifying which actors the ‘management’ consists of, and b) 
measuring their ability to do things. In order to answer a), I first had to find out who is 
managing the EU, or which actors make up the EU leadership. The leadership of the EU in 
general is rather complex, as no institution is the sole hierarchical leader of the Union. The 
EC has independent commissioners, although they are chosen by the national governments 
(McCormick, 2011:80-81). The European Parliament is also independent, and the Members of 
European Parliament (MEPs) are elected directly by the citizens to the Parliament 
(McCormick, 2011:88-89). The European Council is somewhat like a board of directors, 
where the national governments meet and discuss large-scale issues (McCormick, 2011:78). 
Also, the Council of Ministers and the European Central Bank are key actors.  
     Hence, pin-pointing the EU leadership is a complex matter, and the EU institutions 
themselves are not almighty, as they are dependent on the willingness of the member states to 
make major reforms and take important decisions. However, as the EC is the closest the EU 
has to a government (McCormick, 2011:80-81) and it controls the largest bureaucracy of the 
EU, I argue the EC can be assessed as the management in this case. The EC also has a 
hierarchical management structure (its structure is described in detail in 2.1.6), with the 27 
Commissioners at the top, known as ‘the College’, which in turn is led by the President of the 
EC. However, the college tends to act in a very unified manner, thus I consider the College, 
and not just the President, the EC’s leadership. 
     In order to answer question b) about management’s ability to maneuver, I therefore need to 
measure the College’s success rate in performing what is expected of it in terms of leadership 
and general management. One of the main functions of the Commission is to outline the EU’s 
overall strategy (European Commission, 2019a), which is important with regards to finding a 
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way out of the debt crisis. However, it would be challenging to measure the degree of success 
or failures in a long-term strategy. Therefore, I consider their success in terms of another of 
the Commission’s core functions, which is to propose new EU laws and policies (European 
Commission, 2019a). This is operationalized by looking at the amount of proposals sent by 
the Commission to the Council and the Parliament, then assessing the amount of proposals 
that were rejected or passed. I can then compare this success-rate over time: i.e., before, 
during, and after the crisis. Naturally, a respectable success-rate does not mean that the 
implementation of the policy lead to the desired results or lead to any meaningful 
improvement of the overall situation. What I seek to measure is the ‘management’s’ potential 
inability to maneuver, i.e., whether the Commission was hindered in performing its duty in 
the period of crisis and uncertainty. If a significant number of their proposals in this period 
were rejected, this represents an indicator that the Commission was not able to lead in an 
efficient manner.  
     In addition to observing data on the success-rate of the EC’s data, a second 
operationalization I rely on considers how the power and influence of the EC has been 
affected by the debt crisis. If the Commission has lost ground relative to the other institutions 
of the EU, it arguably indicates the EC’s weakening ability to manage. Luckily, through 
personal communication with Professor Sara Connolly and Professor Hussein Kassim of the 
University of East Anglia, I have gained access to survey data on EC power relative to other 
EU-institutions, which they collected in two surveys of EC staff and General Secretariat Staff 
of the Council (more details in section 4.2 below). This allows measuring the EC’s power 
relative to other institutions of the EU and gives more weight to the argument of whether or 
not the EC has lost power.  
 
3.4.2 - P2: Severing of External Ties 
The idea in this proposition is that allied organizations want to avoid guilt by association, and 
distance themselves from the EC (Hamilton, 2006:334). To operationalize this, I look at the 
positions taken by the EC’s global partners with respect to (the activities of) the EC during the 
crisis. Who are the ECs partners, and which positions have these partners taken with regards 
to the EC during the crisis?  
     First, who can be considered EC partners? Clearly, harsh criticism from i.e. an Australian 
Human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO) would not strike the EC leadership as 
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hard as, for instance, criticism from a closer and more influential allied organization. One 
such ally is the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The IMF and the EC  “are longstanding 
partners, inside and outside the European Union”, particularly since “supporting 
macroeconomic and public finance institutions and policies in the EU partner countries has 
long been a common objective of the EU and IMF”. 
     The ECB is also a part of the European troika, and can thus be argued to be a close ally of 
the EC. An objection here could be that the ECB and EC both are part of the EU. However, 
the ECB is (as detailed in 2.3) a very independent organization, based on the principles of the 
German Bundesbank.  
     Another ally is the World Trade Organization (WTO). The EU is a member of the WTO. 
In addition, all the 28 member states of the EU are members of WTO. The EU and WTO have 
mutual interests with regards to free trade and the removal of tariffs, in addition to close 
overall cooperation, and as such is considered an ally.  
     Another global partner is the World Bank. The World Bank and the EC have close ties, 
and work together on a number of projects, including the Europe 2020 Programmatic Trust 
Fund. This was launched to allow the Commission to benefit from the World Bank’s 
technical assistance and analytical and policy work for reaching the goals of Europe 2020, the 
EU’s growth strategy until 2020 (The World Bank, 2019). The World Bank frames their 
relationship in the following manner, “In the European Union, we have a strong operational 
partnership with several EU Member States and with the European Commission” (The World 
Bank, 2019). Therefore, I argue that the World Bank can be considered a global ally of the 
EC. 
     Finally, the EC works together with numerous UN bodies, and according to the EEAS they 
work together closely on several programmes, including sustainable development, climate 
change, human rights, peace building & conflict prevention, and humanitarian assistance. As 
well as the EU having permanent observer status at the UN, the EU and its member states 
contributes to 30% of the UNs regular budget, and 33% of its peacekeeping budget, thus 
collectively being the UNs largest financial contributor (EEAS, 2020). Therefore, it can be 
argued that the UN too is a close ally and partner of the EC, and I include it in my 
measurement. 
     I did consider other global partners like the United States as well. Before Donald Trump 
was elected President, the United States were a close ally of the EU and considered to be 
supportive of the European project. The influence the US has had as an ally of the EU and a 
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supporter of European integration should not be underestimated. However, the proposition 
does imply that these “allies” are organizations, and I find it more accurate when the allies I 
am assessing all can be classified as organizations. Moreover, if I had included the US, it 
would be natural to include other nation-states, which would have become too unbalanced. 
Furthermore, adding the US – or any other nation-state – would require defining who exactly 
is the relevant partner to the EC. In the US, this could be the US Department of State. Yet, 
since the President often quite heavily is involved in foreign policy and foreign relations, the 
Department of State might not be an accurate representation of all potential US support or 
criticism with regards to the EC as a global ally. Therefore, I choose to exclude the US – or 
any other nation-state – as an ally.  
    After selecting the five mentioned organizations (the IMF, the ECB, the WTO, the World 
Bank and the UN) as my chosen “allies”, I need to observe if previously allied organization 
have “distanced themselves” from the EC. I believe a suitable way to do this is to measure 
(changes in) the tone of official organizational statements, like communiques and other 
formal documents. By doing this in a careful and transparent manner (which I document in 
Chapter 4 below), I can achieve an indication of whether there was a sharper tone from the 
allies in the years of the crisis than before, and whether this sharper tone persisted.  
 
3.4.3 - P3: Disruption of Critical Resource Flow 
As discussed in the theoretical argument in the section 3.2, organizations require legitimacy in 
order to bring in resources like capital and personnel (Hamilton, 2006:334). Therefore, it 
makes sense to examine to what degree the financial crisis has affected ECs accumulation of 
resources, either in terms of capital or personnel. Even though capital in general would seem 
like something that is reasonably straightforward to measure, it brings a bigger challenge with 
regards to the EC’s capital flow. This differs quite a lot from private organizations, which 
have different sources of income than EC/EU (i.e. mostly fixed transfers from the member 
states). However, one aspect of interest is the EC’s budget negotiations. Observing whether 
the crisis made budget negotiations more difficult or not would indicate more skepticism, 
especially from a member state point of view. My first operationalization of critical resource 
flow disruption thus is whether it has become easier or more difficult to negotiate a budget 
following the debt crisis. This is done by conducting a descriptive statistical analysis of 
documents related to the budget negotiations from the EC and uncovering potential 
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negotiation obstacles or issues (more details in section 4.3).  
     When it comes to personnel, Murdoch et al. (mimeo) show that many member states 
became more reluctant about sending out their seconded national experts to work in Brussels 
following the European debt crisis. This meant the EC would be missing out on a lot of 
expertise it could otherwise count on. According to numbers of SNEs working in the 
Commission, there was a drop by about 20% from 2010/2011 to 2017 (Murdoch, et al. 
mimeo). This drop could suggest a connection between the debt crisis and the decreasing 
numbers of SNEs and constitutes a good measure for disruption of critical resource flow.  
     SNEs are not the only personnel the EC recruits. EPSO’s EU Concours program receives a 
large amount of applications annually, well above the number of vacancies advertised (so they 
are likely able to fill those vacancies). However, these data were ultimately not available to 
me. I was however provided with some great data of staff composition of the EC by prof. 
Gravier and prof. Roth. This data could prove very useful in order to study the changes in EC 
staff composition. I thus operationalize access to personnel resources via the staff 
composition data for the EC and observe these numbers over time to get a sense of the 
variation around the crisis period under analysis. 
     Staffing figures have gone noticeably down in the pre-2004/2007 member states, which in 
part could be explained by decreasing interest among potential applicants (Gravier, M & C. 
Roth, 2019:35) There are also findings that suggest that certain member states have a much 
lower ratio of EU staffers as their population should suggest, for instance the UK, who’s ratio 
has been in a steep decline since 2004 (corrected for 2004 and 2007 enlargements) (Gravier & 
Roth, 2019:20:21). It would be interesting to see if these numbers correlate with declining 
legitimacy in the UK in the same timeframe. Other contributing factors could be that the 
British civil servants who joined the EU bureaucracy in the first few years of the UK joining 
the EU/EC, were retiring or nearing retirement, and the amount of (and recruitment of new) 
junior staffers were not sufficient to compensate for the departing senior staffers (House of 
Commons, 2013:3). More on this in 4.2.3. 
 
3.4.4 - P4: Tainting of Organizational Reputation 
To find out about the EC’s reputation, one key group of interest are EU citizens. Of course, 
other actors could be interesting to observe (like big private companies, other countries and 
such), but a key issue is whether the EC’s reputation among its people became tainted 
35 
 
following the European debt crisis. I rely on Eurobarometer survey data to operationalize this 
potential tainting of the EC’s reputation. The Eurobarometer is a series of public opinion 
surveys conducted regularly on behalf of the European Commission (Nissen, Sylke, 2012, p. 
713-714). It contains a number of questions that are directly relevant to operationalizing the 
reputation of the EU and EC. Using the standard Eurobarometer 84 from the autumn of 2015 
as a reference, several relevant questions were identified. Among them was a question about 
the image of the European union. The question is formulated as: “in general, does the EU 
conjure up for you a very positive, fairly positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative 
image”. This question directly asks about the opinion of respondents about the EU, which I 
argue is a good indicator for its reputation among respondents.  
    Another question in the Eurobarometer I rely on to operationalize EC’s reputation in 
proposition P4 enquires whether the people’s voice in the EU counts. This is a good indicator 
of measuring how democratic citizens find the EU. If they simply consider the EU to be some 
complex system they are unable to influence, or that voting in the European Parliament 
elections generally will not have any influence on the policy process or policy outcome in the 
EU system, this reflects a low reputation of the EU among its citizens. The question is 
formulated as: “Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree with each of the following 
statements”, where they respond or disagree to several statements about voting in the EU.  
    Finally, two comments should be made. First, when the crisis still loomed large in 2013, 
Croatia joined the EU. The challenge here is that as Croatia never experienced a pre-crisis EU 
as a member state, it is not eligible for a longitudinal study. Therefore, I simply exclude 
Croatia from this measure, as I will only have data from after the crisis, not before. Second, 
several of the questions included in my analysis observe public opinion on the EU in general. 
The reason is that after browsing the Eurobarometer surveys from the early 2000s to the late 
2010s, I noticed that there are only few questions that are related directly the EC. I therefore 
concluded that it is better to also include questions about the EU more generally, in addition 
to the question in the Eurobarometer about the citizens trust in the EC. The underlying 
argument is that, as established in P1 earlier in this section, the EC has a government-like role 
within the EU and can be seen as its management. Thus, the reputation of the EU reflects 
opinions on the EC as well. A potentially weakened EU reputation would indicate a weakened 





Chapter 4 - Methods and Data 
As I now have established the theoretical basis for my thesis by showing the applicability of 
the theory as well as operationalizing Hamilton’s propositions, I will in this section describe 
the methods I have chosen for the thesis. A researcher’s design is usually either quantitative, 
or qualitative, or both (in a mixed methods design). My design will utilize both qualitative 
and quantitative methods depending on the proposition under evaluation. In the remainder of 
this chapter, I will describe the methods and data I use, as well as discussing potential 
measurement issues. In addition, questions of validity, reliability and generalizability will be 
deliberated. In the following section, however, I will first argue for why this research is best 
suited as a case study.  
 
4.1 - Case Study 
In this thesis, I study how the legitimacy of the EC evolved around the debt crisis. As such, I 
engage in a case study of one specific institution (the EC) at one particular period in time (the 
debt crisis). 
A case is identified as a “spatially and temporally delimited phenomenon of theoretical 
significance” (Gerring, 2017, p. 27). These cases could be states, organizations, or social 
groups etc. This means that this research will be conducted as a case study, which Gerring 
(2017, p. 28) defines as “an intensive study of a single case or a small number of cases which 
draws on observational data and promises to shed light on a larger population of cases”. If the 
case is regarded as representative of a greater population of cases, it also places the study into 
a theoretical and academic context. The case is then set up to be analyzed through the lens of 
existing terms and theories of the field of study (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 21). Case studies 
are highly focused, and the researcher spends a lot of time studying, analyzing, and 
ultimately, presenting the case at hand (Gerring, 2017, p. 28). It is also vital to  argue why 
one’s case is good for one’s proposition – not because it necessarily will confirm the 
proposition, but because it is a good representation of the type of cases one would like to 
study (which provides it with generalizing value for the research) (George & Bennett, p. 28). I 
will discuss and defend my choice of case at the end of this section.  
      There are many varieties of case studies. The most important distinction is between a 
37 
 
focused study that reflects upon a larger population and a study aimed at explaining a single 
case, the former being nomothetic and the latter being ideographic (Gerring, 2006, p. 707). As 
I will examine the legitimacy of the EC around the debt crisis in light of four propositions, my 
design will be more of the ideographic nature, rather than a nomothetic design. My approach 
thus is also more in line with a single-outcome study, where the aim is to “investigate a 
bounded unit in an attempt to elucidate a single outcome occurring within that unit” (Gerring, 
2006, p. 707). Even though such studies aim to explain the given case, generalizing to other 
similar populations or cases (i.e. other international organizations) is to some degree 
unavoidable, especially if they are similar in nature (Gerring, 2006, p. 712). An alternative 
approach would be to rely on cross-case studies, which is a case study of several cases. 
Studying several cases has clear positives, as one gets the chance to compare and assess the 
different cases, in addition to the study potentially becoming increasingly representative. 
However, the cost of this is (in the event one spends the same amount of time and resources 
on the study) the depth of the study.  Specifically, with this design, one will not be able to 
study the cases as intensively as an in-depth study of a single case will allow for (Gerring, 
2017, p. 20). Although the theorical model I base my study on, Hamilton’s model (2006), 
could be appropriate in a larger cross-case study including different organizations relevant to 
the debt crisis (such as the IMF and the ECB), I abstained from this approach. As I would 
rather intensively study the EC and the data requirements for a cross-case study would be 
very substantial (and beyond the possibilities for a single master thesis), I chose to avoid 
using a cross-case study. This is left for future research. 
     There are several reasons I selected the European Commission during the debt crisis as my 
case. This is first of all because I found it interesting. My starting point was to study the EU in 
the present day, and I was interested in finding out why it had become such a controversial 
organization in the eyes of increasingly more people. Then, reading about how a devastating 
crisis can affect the legitimacy of the organizations involved, I thought the time was ripe for 
an application of these ideas to the EU setting. As I realized the EU could prove to be a too 
large and complex of a case given that there are several different institutions to take into 
consideration, I ended up with a focus on the EC. This institution represents the EU, but to a 
larger degree also acts like a unified organization – both of which elements are important in 




4.2 - Data 
In the following section all relevant data for the analysis are examined. This is important in 
order to get a clear overview of what data I have collected, and thus better elucidate the 
reasons for choosing the method approaches for the analysis. In addition, listing the data 
facilitates a more fluent, precise and concise analysis chapter, and allows for more time 
discussing the results in the next chapter. Data considered significant for the propositions, 
discussed in chapter 2, will be listed, and occasionally quoted, and their inclusion will be 
defended. Accordingly, the section will follow the propositions chronologically, starting with 
the relevant data for proposition 1, ending with proposition 4. Finally, there will be a section 
with additional comments and a short general discussion about the data.    
 
4.2.1 - P1: Management Maneuver 
The data was found at the European Union Open Data Portal (ec.europa.eu, 2020). This 
provides a large directory of reports, policy proposals and other datasets, which can be 
utilized to find overviews of all the policy proposals from the Commission. I extracted 
information about the amount of policy proposals sent from the Commission to the Council 
and the Parliament, as well as looking up the number of approved and rejected proposals. This 
was done for a ten-year period, from four years before the crisis, 2006-2009, to six years into 
the crisis 2010-2015. However, one complicating issue is that the average review time for a 
proposal is 15 months (europarl.europa.eu, 2019). Thus, many legislative proposals will not 
be processed during a given year. However, as the last year of my analysis is 2015, all 
proposals are as of today (June 2020) either approved or rejected. 
     This presented me with a dilemma. The first approach would be to analyze the data as they 
were, year by year. Meaning, I simply look at how many proposals were submitted by the EC 
in a given year, and how many were rejected, and thus formulate the success-rate from those 
numbers. A potential problem with this approach is that it does not properly reflect the timing 
of the proposals. Rejected or approved proposals from the first few years were in many cases 
proposals from years prior to the timeframe of 2006-2015. Therefore, there would be 
proposals from before 2006 being approved or rejected in 2006. Likewise, there would be 
proposals from the later years of my timeframe (say, from 2014), that would still not be 
approved or rejected at the end of my observation period. The second approach would be to 
look at every proposal from 2006-2015 and observe whether or not they got approved at some 
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point. This likewise has a potential downside since this could involve some of the proposals 
being proposed in 2015 becoming approved only after my timeframe – which would be 
reflecting Parliament and Council sentiments from after the time I intend to measure.  
     A perfect approach is difficult to come by, and arguably the only way it would be 
completely perfect would be when proposals were processed within the year. Still, this would 
entail the unrealistic scenario that all proposals from the EC have to be submitted early in the 
year, thereby giving the legislative branches a chance to review the proposals within the 
course of that year. Clearly, this cannot work. Although both of the outlines of the approaches 
above have potential downsides, I choose to pursue the former approach, and look at 
proposals, acceptances and rejections year by year. I believe this still is a good way to 
measure the EC’s success as a managing organization. The number of proposals they submit 
in any given year says something about their level of activity, while the number being 
approved or rejected says something about their legitimacy in a given year among the MEPs 
in the Parliament and the member state representatives in the Council. Thus, I found this 
approach to be most fruitful. 
     All of the data I collected for the timeframe were available at a subsection of the 
Publications Office of the EU, the EUR-lex (2020b)16. Here, all the proposals submitted by 
the EC are listed in yearly tables, as well as all the actual documents sent from the EC to the 
Parliament and the Council. The proposals are branded legal acts and are listed in several 
categories: adopted acts – the proposals that are adopted – and repealed acts – the proposals 
that are rejected. Both of these subcategories are further divided into different types of acts, 
including legislative acts, other legislative acts, non-legislative acts, implementing acts and 
other acts. I restrict attention to legislative acts that are processed through the OLP (further 
details in 2.1.6), because these are most directly relevant to the proposition. These legislative 
acts are then further divided into three types of acts, namely: regulations, directives and 
decision. Regulations are acts that are binding in all member states, from a certain date. 
Directives are acts that set a goal for all member states to accomplish. However, the form and 
content of this is chosen by the member states, as long as they reach the aforementioned 
goals. Finally, decisions are binding acts for those member states the decision concerns, and 
may include a single or several member states, in addition to for instance corporations. All 
 
16 For more information, see Annex 1. 
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three types of legislative acts are included in my analysis, independent of whether they are 
basic acts or amending acts. Basic acts are standard new legislative proposals, whereas 
amending acts are amendments, revisions of existing EU law. Thus, the main data used for the 
analysis of this proposition is listed in table 1 (data.europa.eu). 
 
TABLE 1 - ADOPTED ACTS THROUGH OLP (2006-2015) 
 Basic Acts Amending Acts Adopted Acts 
2006 82 19 101 
2007 35 18 53 
2008 58 63 63 
2009 106 41 147 
2010 34 23 57 
2011 44 33 77 
2012 41 28 69 
2013 77 37 114 
2014 107 40 147 
2015 25 35 60 
Source: Legal acts – statistics (EUR-Lex, 2020b). 
 
Table 1 displays basic acts and amending acts for the ten-year timeframe of 2006-2015, in 
addition to listing the adopted acts, which is the sum of basic and amending acts. These data 
were, as mentioned above, collected from the EUR-Lex website of the EU’s Publication 
Office, under Legal acts – statistics (EUR-Lex, 2020b). This is the complete list of adopted 
acts every year, adopted by the OLP. 
     Then I also collected information about the legislative proposals from the EC. The 
numbers listed in table 2 are the total number of the EC’s annual legislative proposals. The 
data is from the same online location as table 1, the EUR-lex, under Commission proposals – 








TABLE 2 - PROPOSALS FROM THE EC (2006-2015) 
 Basic Acts Amending Acts Total acts 
2006 60 51 111 
2007 68 35 103 
2008 77 45 122 
2009 45 22 67 
2010 63 42 105 
2011 148 17 165 
2012 73 20 93 
2013 80 51 131 
2014 52 23 75 
2015 38 11 49 
Source: Legal acts – statistics (EUR-lex, 2020b). 
 
Finally, table 2 presents the number of proposals from the EC that were rejected through the 
OLP by the Parliament or Council in 2006-2015. The data was extracted from the same 















TABLE 3 - REJECTED OR EXPIRED LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS (2006-2015) 
 Expired acts Repealed acts Total acts 
2006 34 20 64 
2007 10 3 13 
2008 6 6 12 
2009 28 26 54 
2010 22 17 39 
2011 3 15 18 
2012 5 15 20 
2013 18 97 115 
2014 7 29 36 
2015 11 50 61 
Source: Legal acts – statistics (EUR-lex, 2020b). 
 
The data presented in tables 1-3 is analyzed in detail in the following chapter (chapter 5).  
 
4.2.2 - P2: Severing of External Ties 
For the second proposition, the data consists of official organizational statements, like 
communiques and other formal documents, as well a limited number of news documents. As 
established in section 3.4.2, the chosen allied organizations are the IMF, the ECB, the WTO, 
the World Bank and the UN. It was important to find as many relevant public documents from 
each organization as possible. Obviously, it would not feasible to expect that there would be 
documents for each organization where they explicitly described their opinion on the EC 
every year. Thus, some of the documents merely mentioned the EC or the EU briefly, while 
not being the main topic of the document. However, other documents were more 
straightforward, and more directly communicated support, neutrality or criticism. This is 
something that will be taken into consideration in the analysis. Below, table 4 lists the number 





TABLE 4 - COLLECTED DOCUMENTS  
 IMF ECB WTO World 
Bank 
UN Total 
2006 1 1 1 - 1 4 
2007 1 1 1 - - 3 
2008 1 - - 1 1 3 
2009 1 1 1 1 - 4 
2010 1 1 - 1 1 4 
2011 1 1 1 1 - 4 
2012 1 1 - 1 1 4 
2013 1 1 1 1 - 4 
2014 1 - - 1 1 3 
2015 1 - 1 1 1 4 
Total 10 7 6 8 6 37 
Source: Various documents17 
 
As evident in table 4, an extensive number of documents have been accumulated, totaling 37 
documents. I had initially planned to have one document per ally for every year, but it was 
challenging to find communiques or other formal documents mentioning the allied 
organizations relationship to the EC for every year. In a few instances, due to lack of official 
documents mentioning the relationship, I looked for media sources interviewing executives of 
the organizations. Although this required taking extra steps to ensure the quality and validity 
of the sources, as well as only sticking reputable news organizations, I believe these additions 
to be important to maintain a solid amount of coverage of every ally through of the years.  
 
 
17 Further details in Annex 2. 
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4.2.3 - P3: Disruption of Critical Resource Flow 
The third proposition is – as established in section 3.4.3 – divided into two critical resources: 
capital and personnel. The budget portion will be based on documents from the yearly budget 
negotiations in the EU, observing whether the EC experienced any potential challenges 
getting the budget approved before, during or after the European debt crisis, in the same ten-
year timeframe as the other propositions. Documents related to the budget negotiations are 
available from a subsection of the Publication Office, the EUR-lex (2020a)18. I have obtained 
documents regarding the budget negotiations from 2006-2015 under the budgetary procedure 
section. Here, all the documents ranging from budget proposals from the EC, to objections 
from the legislative branches, and budget adoptions, are located. 
     With regards to the personnel portion, my ideal data would be application numbers for the 
Concours-programs, as I intended to observe the variation in the application numbers, 
potentially disclosing a negative impact of the European debt crisis on the application 
numbers. However, as these application numbers were not available online, I tried gaining 
access by contacting European Personnel Selection Office (EPSO). Unfortunately, I was not 
able to gain access. However, I did fortunately get access to data sent by professor Magali 
Gravier and professor Camille Roth. This data concerns the staff composition of the EC by 
country in any given year. The data Gravier & Roth (2020, p. 7) uses were obtained from the 
EC, and cover the period from 1980 until 2013. I was sent data from 2003 until 2013, 
allowing me to study a ten-year period that is very close to the other timelines used for my 
other propositions. The data for both personnel and capital will be further explored in chapter 
5. 
 
4.2.4 - P4: Tainting of Organizational Reputation 
To measure the effect the European debt crisis had on the reputation of the EC, I analyze 
changes in responses to specific questions in the Standard Eurobarometer surveys over time. 
The Standard Eurobarometer surveys are published biannually, and all the questions 
employed in my analysis – discussed in detail below – are included in every wave of the 
survey (with one small exception I will return to later). Hence, I can observe the general trend 
 
18 For more details on links, see Annex 3. 
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from 2006 through 2015. The relevant Eurobarometer publications are listed in table 4.6 
below (European Commission, 2020).   
 
 
TABLE 5 - EUROBAROMETER PUBLICATIONS 
 Issue nr. Edition Publication date 
1 65 Spring March 2006 
2 66 Autumn Sept. 2006 
3 67 Spring April 2007 
4 68 Autumn Sept. 2007 
5 69 Spring March 2008 
6 70 Autumn Oct. 2008 
7 71 Spring June 2009 
8 72 Autumn Oct. 2009 
9 73 Spring May 2010 
10 74 Autumn Nov. 2010 
11 75 Spring May 2011 
12 76 Autumn Nov. 2011 
13 77 Spring May 2012 
14 78 Autumn Nov. 2012 
15 79 Spring May 2013 
16 80 Autumn Nov. 2013 
17 81 Spring May 2014 
18 82 Autumn Nov. 2014 
19 83 Spring May 2015 
20 84 Autumn Nov. 2015 
 
As table 5 shows, the Standard Eurobarometer are published in the spring and the autumn, 
usually around the same months every year. The first eight issues were published in the 
months of March, April or June (Spring) and September or October (Autumn), whereas the 
latter twelve issues where published in May (Spring) and November (Autumn). The questions 
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my study focuses on are included in all the Eurobarometer editions, providing the analysis 
with consistent data for every year.  
     So, how are these Eurobarometer surveys conducted? Every survey is comprised of around 
1000 face-to-face interviews in every member state. It is important to note that there have 
been changes to EU membership status during the ten years I analyze. Most notably, Croatia 
joined during/after the crisis (which is discussed in more detail in section 3.4.4). In addition, 
Bulgaria and Romania joined the EU in January 2007.  However, as noted in issue 65, these 
two countries were already destined to join the EU at the date of publication and are included 
in the Standard Eurobarometer 65 and 66 as acceding countries. They are naturally included 
as member states in issues 67-84. Hence, no major problem exists for them for the data 
collection period.  
     For my analysis of the EC’s reputation, I have (as mentioned briefly in section 3.4.4) 
chosen three of the questions found in the Standard Eurobarometer19. The first question (Q1) 
is related to the image of the EU in the eyes of the EU citizens. The question is formulated as 
follows: 
Q1: “In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very positive, fairly 
positive, neutral, fairly negative or very negative image?” 
Respondents answer one out of five alternatives: “very positive”, “fairly positive”, “neutral”, 
“fairly negative” or “very negative”. In addition, the respondents can choose to express that 
they “don’t know”.  
     The second question (Q2) is related to whether the EU citizens feel that their voice in the 
EU counts. The question is formulated as follows: 
Q2: “Please tell me for each statement, whether you tend to agree or tend to disagree? 
My voice counts in the European Union.” 
Q2 measures whether or not people feel voting in the European elections has any substantial 
value and impact. It is formulated in a different manner to Q1. This question is part of section 
of statements being read to them, where they share whether they agree with the statements or 
not. The alternatives are thus: “tend to agree” or “tend to disagree”, or if they are unsure/do 
not know: “don’t know”.  
 
19 For the question formulations, I used the Eurobarometer 65 (2006) as reference.  
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     The final question (Q3) is related to the EU citizens’ trust in the EC. The question is 
similar in its formulation to Q2, as respondents are asked whether or not they trust the 
different institutions of the EU, such as the Parliament, the Council, the ECJ and the ECB, in 
addition to the Commission. Q3 is formulated as follows: 
 Q3: “And for each of them, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it?” 
The question follows up on another two questions in the Eurobarometer surveys asking 
whether respondents had heard about the mentioned institutions. This explains the 
formulation of Q3, which was a follow-up question. The alternatives for the respondents 
were: “tend to trust” and “tend not to trust”, or unsure/do not know: “don’t know”. 
 
4.3 - Quantitative Descriptive Analysis 
A first methodological approach employed in my thesis is quantitative descriptive analysis. 
This will be used with respect to theoretical propositions P1 and P4, as well as the part of P3 
dealing with personnel. As explained in more detail in the previous section, for these 
propositions I collected quantitative datasets (e.g., Eurobarometer data for P4 and statistics on 
EC staff composition for P3). Descriptive statistics are therefore useful to summarize the data 
collected and emphasize potential variation within the timeframe under study. By using 
STATA and Excel, I compare developments in the acquired datasets during a ten-year period, 
well before and after the debt crisis. This is a good tool to measure the potential variation in 
time, even when you do not intend to locate causal relationships (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 
80). In the remainder of this section, the details of the approaches employed with respect to 
propositions P1, P3 and P4 will be expanded upon. 
 
4.3.1 - P1 – Management Maneuver 
For P1 I use data from the EUR-Lex (2020b) (Detailed in section 4.2.1) to study the share of 
policy proposals that were rejected or approved in the Council and the Parliament during the 
2006-2015 timeframe. More specifically, I calculate a success-rate for the Commission’s 
policy proposals before, during and after the crisis and plot these success rates over time. The 
amount of accepted or rejected proposals will thus be summarized year by year. This cross-
temporal information allows me to form an image of whether the EC was able to perform its 
role during the crisis, and whether it was able to succeed with the proposals they presented to 
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the legislative chambers of the EU. The variation is studied graphically as well as using a 
simple comparison of mean success scores across different periods of time, the years before 
the crisis (pre-crisis) 2006-2009 versus the years after the crisis 2010-2015, (post-crisis). Any 
notable differences during the timeframe are then discussed in further detail. 
 
4.3.2 – P3 – Disruption of Critical Resource Flow – Capital 
For this proposition, I use descriptive statistical analysis of data found at EUR-Lex (2020b), 
related to the EC budget negotiations (i.e., annual budget draft proposals from the EC, and 
final adoption document). The aim is to measure whether it has become easier or more 
difficult to negotiate a budget around the debt crisis. I do this by measuring the time it took 
for the budget to be adopted (from budget draft to adoption), as well as meausing how many 
steps it took to get it adopted. By steps I mean how many amendments, positions etc. were 
taken by the Council and Parliament before it would eventually be adopted by the Parliament. 
This will be conducted in the same timeframe as all previous propositions, 2006-2015. 
Naturally, any potential change in problematic negotiations can be difficult to measure 
properly. 
     Were there protests or objections to the proposal? Did they overstep the deadline (18 
December of each year)? Did the EC have to draft a completely new budget? The more steps, 
the more amendment and changes will naturally occur. And while some changes are merely 
democratic and positive, severe changes to the budget the EC originally envisioned, does raise 
doubts about their ability to convince the partners in the Parliament and the Council (and of 
course the member states, who are the ones who ultimately fund the budget, and get a say in 
the process through the Council, as well informal inquires). This process is fortunately very 
transparent, as every step is documented, which helps me in this measurement.  
 
4.3.3 - P3 - Disruption of Critical Resource Flow – Personnel 
For this proposition, a descriptive statistical analysis will be conducted in order to see the 
variation in the EC staff composition over time. The variation will be studied, and several 
points in time will be discussed to trace when there were substantial changes around the 
European debt crisis. Here the main focus will be addressing differences between EU15 (the 
member states from before the 2004 enlargement) and EU12 (the new member states of the 
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2004 and 2007 enlargements), as well as noting significant variances between specific 
member states.  
 
4.3.4 - P4 – Tainting of Organizational Reputation 
In order to measure changes in the EC’s reputation over time around the European debt crisis, 
I analyze Eurobarometer survey data over the period 2006 to 2015.  As mentioned in section 
4.2, I specifically rely on three questions directly relevant to operationalizing the reputation of 
the EU and EC. To measure the effect the European debt crisis had on the reputation of the 
EC, I will calculate summary statistics for each year available in the data and graphically 
depict the result. As for P1, any variation over time is studied graphically as well as using a 
simple comparison of mean responses across different periods of time (i.e. five years before 
the crisis, 2006-2010, versus five years into the crisis, 2011-2015). 
 
4.4 - Qualitative Text Analysis 
A second method that will be utilized in this study is qualitative text analysis. This method 
will be used for the assessment of proposition P2. In qualitative text analysis, the content in 
the available documents is examined systematically in order to acquire relevant information 
about the issues under study (Kuckartz, 2019, p. 193). I consider it the most appropriate 
method given the amount of documents/newspaper articles/communiques I have accumulated 
as well as the need to engage in in-depth reading and evaluation of the textual sources. 
Particularly the importance of accounting for the exact context in which particular words 
might appear in each document under analysis involves a level of detail in the coding beyond 
what would be the case in a quantitative text analysis. The standard of quantitative text 
extraction has been to rigidly use smaller parts of the texts, such as single words or smaller 
bags of words.  A strength of the qualitative text analysis I employ is that it allows the use of 
longer paragraphs and bodies of text in interpreting the statements (Krippendorf, 2004, p. 
788). This approach does sacrifice some reliability for increased relevance, which will be 




4.4.1 - P2 – Severing of External Ties 
The second proposition, severing of external ties, is assessed via qualitative document 
analysis using official organizational statements, like communiques and other formal 
documents. By systematically analyzing the documents, I assess the tone in allied 
organization’s statements using a three-option coding scheme: ‘supportive’ (1), ‘neither 
supportive nor critical’ (I use the term “neutral” for the most part) (2), and ‘critical’ (3). I do 
this for the five chosen allied organizations with a timeline stretching from 2006 until 2015 
(like the P1 and P3 timelines mentioned above). As there are not that many formal 
organizational statements about the EC, I took time to carefully go through each of those I 
recovered in detail and coded word extracts from the documents into the above-mentioned 
categories by looking for indicators of sentiment. Some of these are easily found, especially in 
documents that are meant to simply discredit or criticize a policy, whereas others are more 
veiled. For instance, the presence of words like “disagree”, “not convinced” or “not seeing 
eye to eye” were interpreted as indicative of a critical tone. Reversely, words like “[we] stand 
by…”, or simply “support” or “agree” allow me to more easily argue for a supportive tone. If 
there are no real words of proper support or criticism, or if the document is very objectively 
presented, the document was regarded as neutral.  
     As mentioned, this analysis first of all demands that I balance my selection of sources. It is 
crucial to not only look for sources that might support my proposition, but to the best of my 
ability find documents that represent the actual opinions of the organizations at each given 
time. Moreover, a key part of qualitative text analysis is interpretation (Kuckartz, 2019, p. 
196). While every document and statements can be interpreted differently, this method aims 
to reach a degree of consensus on the subjective meaning of the statements, and define the 
categories formed in the statements so “precisely that an intersubjective agreement can be 
achieved” when applying these categories (Kuckartz, 2019, p. 196). Hence, it is key that the 
documents are interpreted as objectively as possible. In order for the reader to verify this, all 
the documents used in this part of the analysis are listed at the end of this thesis and will be 
made easily available.   
 
4.5 – Questions of Measurement Issues 
It is important to be aware of potential measurement issues, which helps avoid the risk of 
biased conclusions. In this section, I therefore discuss a number of potential concerns that 
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could be raised with respect to the operationalization and measurement of my theoretical 
propositions – and how I tried to deal with these during the analysis (as well as during the 
development of my research design). 
     For my first proposition, one potential source of measurement bias is that my definition of 
the EC’s ‘management’ is imprecise. It would be tempting to simply put the entire EC as the 
management in the EU setting, as I assess the EC to be the closest thing the EU has to a 
leading organization (or at least the only proper executive branch). However, as mentioned in 
section 3.4.1, I chose the College as the leadership, instead of only the president or for 
instance the department heads. This allows for the responsibility to rest with the appointed 
leaders, the Commissioners, who all wield power in an often unified manner. Another 
potential concern is related to the data available. Measuring the success-rate of the College 
and the EC in this period requires there to be enough data documenting the legislative process 
in the ten-year timeframe. This requires access to all the relevant documents, and that 
important documents are not being unavailable due to, for instance, confidentially issues. 
However, as the EU has taken steps to increase transparency in the latest decades, this 
concern is at least partially mitigated. 
     As the data from the second proposition are made up of different documents, 
communiques and media articles, there will be a high degree of importance put on the validity 
of the sources (e.g., is the criticism directly from the partners or is there speculation 
involved?). This could be figured out by carefully assessing the sources of the article. This is 
discussed further in section 4.6.2 below. 
     The third proposition measures the EC’s struggle to recruit personnel. I do this by 
measuring recruitment numbers of seconded national experts (SNEs), and I hoped to also 
include the number of applicants for the EUs Concours program. As I did not get the numbers 
directly from EPSO, I had to find an alternative data source. This turned out to be data on 
staff composition (obtained from prof. Gravier, as mentioned above) rather than application 
numbers. The obvious issue here is that the data did not disclose too much information as to 
why these changes in the staff composition happened. Was it only disinterest from the 
different nationalities? Was it lack of funding due to austerity measures? This is something I 
have to discuss, and also admit as a weakness in my data for P3. 
     The fourth proposition is measured using survey data about EU citizens. The 
Eurobarometer-data is a good data source, and they are using sophisticated methods to gather 
data. One potential issue could be linked to the phrasing of the questionnaires. As I am going 
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to measure the reputation and standing of the EC among its citizen, I need to be very 
confident that these numbers are representative and that there is no implicit bias in how the 
questions (and potential values) are formulated. Since there are no references in the questions 
I employ to distinct historical events that may guide respondents’ thoughts in a certain 
direction (such as the debt or migrant crisis), I consider the question formulations sufficiently 
general and free of bias. The Eurobarometer surveys also always rely on a representative 
sample of the population in every country, such that the data are of high value for my kind of 
research. 
 
4.6 – Reliability and validity 
When conducting any kind of analysis, it is imperative that the quality of the data that is being 
analyzed is assessed in a proper manner. This means that it is possible to verify and retest the 
data. The quality of the data is often discussed together with the terms reliability and validity. 
To test the validity and reliability in quantitative research is often considered more straight-
forward than in qualitative research, as it is easier to conduct these tests in for instance a 
large-N statistical analysis than in in-depth research with a smaller number of units (Gerring, 
2017, p. 195). However, it is still important to assess the data in qualitative research as well as 
quantitative research, and one wants to assess whether the analysis is understandable, such 
that it may be more easily repeated (which relates to reliability), whether it is transferable 
(which is related to its external validity) and whether it is credible (which relates to internal 
validity) (Thiel, 2014, p. 150).  
 
4.6.1 - Reliability 
The reliability of a research project deals with the dependability of the data and its 
interpretation. It should be a central goal for any kind of research to facilitate replication by 
future researchers. In projects with a low degree of reliability, variation in the data and 
findings can be caused by the methodological conditions instead of actual differences in the 
phenomena being researched (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 142). On the other hand, high 
reliability provides a great degree of accuracy in the way the data is used, how it has been 
collected and how it has been processed. Therefore, by reducing potential weaknesses in the 




     I have taken a few measures to increase the reliability of the thesis. The first step is to 
accurately depict all the data I am using in my analysis, as well as describing the process and 
methods I have used to collect the data in detail. This will facilitate the process for future 
researchers who want to replicate the research. In addition, I have kept my research quite 
transparent and open, presenting drafts to fellow students, my supervisor and other academic 
personnel quite frequently, which hopefully has contributed in removing any inconsistencies. 
As much of my data is available from open EU sources online, and the rest of the data will be 
accessible without too much struggle, I consider my research to be retestable. If someone 
were to conduct the same research in a few years, using the same data and timeframe, I 
believe it would likely have the same outcome. For these reasons, I consider the reliability of 
my study to be fairly high. 
     With regards to questions of reliability in qualitative text analysis one advantage of said 
analysis is that it does not influence or disturb events, conditions or situations. This type of 
analysis can be considered a stable method, as one can analyze the same documents at 
different moments (Marshall & Rossman, 2010, p. 160). However, a weakness with 
qualitative text analysis is that the researcher’s selection and interpretation of the material 
could influence the findings in the study. As I mentioned in section 4.3.2, qualitative text 
analysis does sacrifice some reliability for relevance since the interpretation is more in the 
hands of the researcher, and the method is less rigid in how it measures the content of the 
documents. As I do a fair share of interpretation, I at times took a step back to consider the 
possibility that I did not observe the data with 100% objectivity but was trying to get the 
finding I had anticipated. It should be noted that the extent of this risk differs between the 
propositions, which will be clarified and expanded upon in the sections below. However, this 
should always be kept in mind when reading my analysis and results. 
     As pointed out at the start of the chapter, the reliability of the source is important to assess, 
and official statements from organizations may be more dependable than remarks from 
uncertain sources in the media. However, an objection to this is that official communiques 
from an organization would likely have a more diplomatic tone and would not be critical 
unless the organization intended for it to be so. This would in my view only strengthen the 
data, as the proposition is measuring potential intentional distancing from the organization in 
question, the EC, as a way of avoiding guilt by association. Potential negative (or positive, for 
that matter) media remarks that were not permitted by the allied organization management are 
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not what I am hoping to use. Hence, although a few media sources have been used, these were 
submitted to very strict inspection. First step in evaluating the source is to see if these are 
supplemented or confirmed by other media sources. The second step involved control for any 
denial of such claims by the organization. Thus, only after a thorough investigation were they 
used to support claims in my analysis. 
 
4.6.2 - Validity 
Validity is an indication of how sound the research is. Validity applies to the research design, 
the methods used, and the validity of the data collection. Thus, the validity of the data with 
regards to the research question (Gerring, 2017, p. 196). This means that the validity in terms 
of my thesis’ data, is an assessment of how well the data I have collected represents the 
phenomena I study, the EC’s legitimacy during the debt crisis. Validity is furthermore divided 
between internal and external validity. Generally, internal validity relates to whether the 
researcher has measured and investigated what he or she intended, while external validity is 
centered around what degree a study can be generalized to other similar phenomena (Gerring, 
2017, p. 219; van Thiel, 2014, p. 49).  
     For the internal validity in the thesis to be high, I need to make sure that I choose the right 
operationalizations, the right data, and exclude data that is not relevant for the research 
question. The data I have chosen for the research question has been chosen meticulously for 
almost a year, and I have spent a lot of time dismissing irrelevant and inaccurate data, while 
locating and selecting relevant data that answers the research question and the propositions. 
Another factor that was vital in increasing the internal validity, was to operationalize the 
propositions such that it was very clear what I was measuring and what I was analysing. 
Uncertain and inaccurate language would decrease the chance of an accurate measurement. 
This was addressed by staying close to the original formulation of the propositions in 
Hamilton (2006) as well as cross-referencing the operationalizations with peer feedback at 
multiple stages during the development of my research design.  
     In terms of the external validity, I assess this to be present. First of all, as I draw my model 
from different research studying private organizations (Hamilton, 2006), there is already a 
level of external validity in my theoretical framework. As I use the same propositions and a 
similar analysis, I would assert that the external validity is high. The framework I further 
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developed is also sufficiently general, such that in my view it can be utilized to analyze loss 
of legitimacy in other public organizations.   
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Chapter 5 – Analysis 
This chapter analyzes the empirical data I have accumulated in light of the theorical 
framework detailed in chapter 3, where the four propositions are the most essential 
parameters. To reiterate, the four propositions (P1-P4) are, management inability to maneuver 
(P1), severing of external ties (P2), Disruption of critical resource flow (P3), tainting of 
organizational reputation (P4). The chapter goes through the data for each of the 
propositions, thereafter the findings are discussed and analyzed. Finally, the findings of the 
four propositions are discussed together, and the larger picture relating to the research 
question is elaborated upon.  
 
5.1 – Is Management Able to Maneuver?  
The first proposition handles the question of whether or not the management of the EC is able 
to maneuver in times of crisis. The data presented in 4.2.1 chiefly illustrated the annual 
number of proposals being submitted by the EC, the number of proposals being rejected by its 
legislative counterparts (the Parliament and the Council), and the number of proposals being 
accepted. In this section, I analyze the EC’s success-rate in proposing new EU laws and 
policies (usually formulated as regulation, directives and decisions in the EU system). The 
success-rate is formulated simply by dividing the number of adopted proposals (a potential 
high number of both would be considered positive for the EC’s performance rating) by the 
sum of adopted and rejected proposals, and finally multiplying the number by 100 to obtain a 
percentage. The result of this is listed in table 6 below:  
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TABLE 6 - SUMMARY OF PROPOSALS, ADOPTED, REJECTED AND SUCCESS-RATE (2006-
2015) 
Year Proposals Adopted Rejected Success-rate 
2006 111 101 64 61,2 
2007 103 53 13 80,3 
2008 122 63 12 84,0 
2009 67 147 54 73,1 
2010 105 57 39 59,4 
2011 165 77 18 81,1 
2012 93 69 20 77,5 
2013 131 114 115 49,8 
2014 75 147 36 80,3 
2015 49 60 61 49,6 
Median 104 73 37,5 75,3 
Mean 102,1 88,8 43,2 67,2 
Mean (2006-09) 100,8 91 35,8 74,7 
Mean (2010-15) 103 87,3 48,2 66,3 
Source: EUR-lex (2020b)20 
 
Listed in table 6 is the number of EC proposals, the adopted proposals through OLP, the 
rejected proposals21, as well as the success-rate for every year (2006-2015). In addition, the 
table also includes the median and the mean of all the categories. The reason both of these are 
listed is to demonstrate for the reader that the while there is a slight variance in between the 
mean and the median, the disparity is not too extreme, which shows that there are not any 
immense outliers affecting the mean. In the following tables, the numbers for every year will 
be posted together with the mean to illustrate how far over or under the average the result for 
each year is. As this not a massive dataset with a huge number of units, I find the mean for the 
10 years to be a more adequate base of reference to compare the different results. 
 
20 For further details, see Annex 1. 
21 Note that the ‘rejected proposals’ include expired proposals as well, which is why I do not formulate it as 
“rejected through OLP”.  
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     To better observe the changes between the years, figure 2 below provides a better 
overview of the success-rate for each year:  
 
FIGURE 2 - ANNUAL SUCCESS-RATE 
 
Source: EUR-lex (2020b)22 
 
Figure 2 illustrates the development of the success-rates listed in figure 2. During the pre-
crisis years (2006-2009), the success-rate averages at 74,7. Although the success-rate 
fluctuates year-by-year and does not remain too stable, the overall success-rate of the pre-
crisis years is significantly more robust than the post-crisis years. The post-crisis years only 
averages at 66,3 making it more to 8 below. While it may seem peculiar that the success-rate 
was so low in 2010, to then rise considerably the following year, it does make sense, as the 
full scope and potential disastrous consequences of the debt crisis was becoming more evident 
for everyone, as established in section 2.3.2. Meanwhile, the rate does increase incrementally 
for the two years (2011 and 2012), which was a period where the crisis still was in progress, 
before falling and rising throughout the remaining years of the sample years. I would expect 
was a period when EC still worked actively to formulate legislation that could hinder future 
 
22 For further details, see Annex 1 
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potential devastating effects of the crisis, as well taking steps to halt the current crisis, which 
did not show signs abruptly ending. Furthermore, if such legislative proposals were deemed 
satisfactory by the Council and the Parliament, I would expect them to aim to adopt them if 
they had the trust in the EC’s ability and judgment. For the last year in the timeframe, the 
most drastic drop in the rate is observed. With a success-rate at only 49,6 it is by far the 
lowest success-rate in the timeframe, with the closest being 49,8 in 2013 and 59,4 in 2010, all 
within the post-crisis years. This is not a positive development for the EC’s performance, and 
while these success-rate numbers are only indicators, it must be disheartening for the EC that 
the three lowest success-rate values are located in the post-crisis period (2010, 2013 and 
2015). However, it must be noted, that the highest success-rate value is found in the latter part 
of the timeframe (2011), thus, painting a more complex picture. However, one value, is not 
something I am too concerned about, as the focus of the study is the trends. This, of course, is 
further analyzed by looking more closely at the proposal, adoption and rejection numbers in 
the next paragraph. 
     The success-rate numbers in table 6 and figure 2 illustrated an interesting development 
over the years. It did however not show any consistent decrease or increase in the success-rate 
over time. The first four years showed signs of a stable rate of success, while the last six have 
the four lowest values and the two highest. Thus, in order to better understand these rates, 















FIGURE 3 - ANNUAL PROPOSALS FROM THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
SOURCE: EUR-LEX (2020B) 
 
Figure 3 shows the number of legislative proposals from the EC for every year in the 
timeframe (2006-2015), represented by the blue columns. The intersecting orange horizontal 
line represents the average number of proposals (the average is 102,1). Interestingly, the 
numbers somewhat correspond to the trend in figure 2. Starting out, the first few years (2006-
2008) are somewhat similar, in the 100-120 range. In 2009, the number of proposals dropped 
considerably, from 122 to 67, a fall of 55 proposals. The number of proposals in the following 
year (2010) increases to slightly above the average number, while the amount of proposals in 
2011 (165) was the highest amount in the entire ten-year timeframe, which is a somewhat 
positive sign for the EC, showing they remained active at least at the start of this devastating 
crisis, which corresponds well with the success-rate number from 2011. Yet, the 2012 
numbers are well below average, while the 2013 (131) numbers increase to the second highest 
number of proposals in the timeframe. However, in the following years the EC proposal 
decreased to well below average in 2014 (75) and 2015 (49).  
    While the amount of proposals submitted by the EC during the timeframe (2006-2015) is a 
solid way to measure the activity of the EC during the period, it is not sufficient on its own. I 
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also need to analyze the number of proposals that were adopted through OLP. The EC could 
have submitted three or four times the number of proposals, but if none of these were adopted, 
it would have been of no use, and no real display of leadership and actual ability to get things 
done. In figure 4 below, the number of adopted proposals is presented. 
 
FIGURE 4 - ANNUAL ADOPTED PROPOSALS THROUGH OLP 
 
Source: EUR-lex (2020b) 
 
Figure 4 shows the annual number of proposals adopted through OLP. Basically, this is the 
number of proposals adopted by the EC’s legislative counterparts, the Council and the 
Parliament. The blue columns represent the number of proposals being adopted, while the 
intersecting orange horizontal line represents the average number of proposals adopted during 
the ten-year timeframe (2006-2015). When looking at the different years, it becomes clear 
that there is a great deal of variety. From a high of 147 adopted proposals in both 2009 and 
2014 to a low of 53 adoptions in 2007, the former two years having close to three times the 
amount of adopted proposals. From the perspective of my research question, there is no clear 
pattern before and after the crisis kicks in. Still, in 2013 the number of adopted proposals 
increases to a number well above the average, up to 114. In the following year, 2014, the 
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number is 147. These higher numbers of adopted legislation are likely to be linked to the high 
number of proposals submitted by the EC in 2011 and 2013 (see table 5.3). As the average 
amount of time for a proposal to be adopted on the first reading in the 2009-2014 legislative 
term was 17 months, this appears quite consistent with finding an increased number of 
adoptions in 2013 and 2014 (eurparl.europa.ec). I would personally expect that urgent matters 
would be moved to the front of the legislative line, but that appears not to have been the case 
here (although this is naturally very hard to judge based purely on the numbers observed 
here). Finally, the last year of the timeframe, 2015, only had a mere 60 adopted proposals. 
     The last piece of the puzzle is the rejected proposals. These numbers are an important part 
of the success-rate as they give a good indication of how the legislative branches regard the 
EC, and in the case they do not trust its ability to lead effectively, it will reflect in the how 
they treat the legislation submitted to them by the EC. Thus, a low level of rejection would be 
a good indicator in the EC’s eyes, whilst a high level of rejected proposals would be bad 
news. These numbers are presented in figure 5 below. The blue columns represent the annual 
rejected proposals, while the orange horizontal line represents average annual rejected 
proposals. 
 
FIGURE 5 - ANNUAL REJECTED PROPOSALS 
 




At first glance, it is evident that there are major differences between the years, and it is hard to 
determine what would be considered a ‘normal’ year. The first year few years in the 
timeframe goes from 64 rejected proposals in 2006 to 12 and 13 in 2007 and 2008. As 
mentioned, low values here would be considered positive for the EC, so in addition to 2007 
and 2008, the early debt crisis years of 2011 and 2012 can be considered quite successful, 
with only 18 and 20 rejected proposals every year. This indicates that the EC had decent 
amount of room to maneuver in the crucial first years of the crisis. However, in 2013, a year 
still considered within the crisis years, 115 number of proposals were rejected, which is 
definitely substantial when taking into consideration that only 18 (2011) and 20 (2012) 
proposals were rejected in the two previous years. The number decreased to the below 
average 36 in 2014, and 61 in 2015. It is definitely a concern for the EC that the year with the 
highest number of rejected proposals was during the crisis years. However, the following two 
years did improve somewhat. These numbers are further discussed in the overall discussion in 
section 5.5.  
 
5.2 – Severed Ties 
The second proposition states that a crisis can lead to allied organizations distancing 
themselves from the EC, which from a theoretical perspective can signal a potential loss of 
legitimacy. As detailed in 4.2.2, I thus assess whether allied organizations have taken a 
different position towards the EC during and after the crisis. I have done this by obtaining 
documents in which the allied organizations position themselves relative to the EC, and code 
these documents as expressing either support, criticism or takes a more neutral stance. The 





FIGURE 6 - STANCE OF EC ALLIES 
 
Source: Various documents 
 
Figure 6 presents the findings from the text analysis. As evident, the early years of the 
timeframe show signs of the allied organizations mostly being either neutral or supportive. 
Criticism appears to be largely absent especially in the first three years of my sample period. 
The first critical statement from the allies was not found before 2009, when the leader of the 
World Bank, Robert Zoellick, criticized the EC and EU for their passiveness with regards to 
helping the eastern European countries during the global financial crisis, (“Mr. 
Zoellick…needed more backing from Brussels”). An instance of a supportive statement, came 
the previous year, in 2008, from then Managing Director of the IMF, Dominque Strass-Kahn, 
praising the EC for its independence and success (“…Mr. Strauss-Kahn said that Europe 
already had very successful institutions, such as the Commission, the Parliament and the 
European Central Bank”). The neutral statements are those that mention the EC or the EU, but 
do not fall within the codes for support or the codes for criticism. There were some neutral 
statements in the early years of the timeframe, but they did increase considerably after 2008, 
and in 2010, the first year of the crisis, all of the statements simply mentioned the EC, but did 
not express any support or criticism. 
     The first years of the timeframe did not show signs of any large-scale criticism from the 
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EC’s allies, as the statements were mostly neutral in character. However, the number of 
neutral statements did slowly decrease during the post-crisis years. In 2011, there was one 
recorded instance of criticism, once again from the World Bank. However, the true watershed 
moment came in 2013. That year marked two critical statements, the first one was from the 
WTO which criticized the EC for lack of necessary reform (“Among the causes of the crises 
were lack of appropriate fiscal reforms…”). WTO was allied organization which had 
previously been either supportive or neutral. In addition, criticism came from the IMF which 
likewise had expressed support and had been a close partner with the EC as a part of the 
Troika. The IMF now expressed concerns with regards to the austerity measures the Troika 
had been pushing on Greece, which they meant had the opposite effect of what was intended. 
As the crisis had now ravaged the European continent for several years, more of the allied 
organizations seemed keen to voice their concern at what they saw as either mismanagement 
or missed opportunities. IMF, who had previously voiced doubts about the austerity measures 
(detailed in 2.3.3), where especially vocal during the later years of the timeframe. And kept 
up its criticism during the sample years. It culminated in outright disapproval in 2015, 
criticizing the 2015 bailout deal given by the EU (“highly unsustainable…well beyond what 
was been under consideration to date”). It must be noted, that the ECB remained either neutral 
or positive towards the EC throughout the sample years. However, as they are both a part of 
the EU, and had to work closely together during the crisis years, it makes sense that they kept 
disagreements to a minimum, at least superficially. Also, the UN remained relatively 
unchanged during the crisis years, and did not comment on the EC’s performance. 
     The overall trend for the EC is not particularly positive. Most of the statements early on 
were either neutral or supportive in character, and the number of critical statements remained 
low until the debt crisis commenced. While the statements were generally neutral or positive 
during the early years of the crisis, it did turn towards the negative in the latter part and the 
aftermath of the crisis. In the post-crisis years, a total of six critical statements were voiced, as 
opposed to only one in the pre-crisis years. This observed pattern could indicate that a few of 
allied organizations to a degree did distance themselves from the EC towards the end of the 
debt crisis, as it became apparent to them that the EC had not done enough, had chosen the 
wrong path, or (as we saw when analyzing proposition 1 in section 5.1) perhaps was not 
powerful enough to counter the crisis to a satisfactory degree, or not strong enough to counter 
the opinions of strong member states (such as Germany). It could suggest that some of the 




5.3 – Disrupted Resources 
The third proposition claims a crisis causes a disruption in the organization’s resources, which 
is considered a vital aspect of the potential loss of organizational legitimacy. As discussed 
extensively first in section 3.3 and later in the operationalization in section 3.4.3, this 
proposition consists of two parts, namely capital and personnel. As further discussed in 4.2.3, 
the data used to measure the capital has been collected from the EU budget negotiations from 
2006-2015. The data used to measure the personnel part was collected by Gravier and Roth 
(2020) for their study on the European Commission’s staff composition. Due to their 
generosity, I was able to attain the data, which I am incredibly appreciative of.  
 
5.3.1 – Capital 
 This section looks into the capital part of the proposition. I should note that this study focuses 
on the annual EU budget, instead of the long-term EU budget, which covers a period of five 
to seven years. How the process of budget negotiations is structured, is discussed in more 
detail in 2.1.6. As described there, the EU has a treaty timetable for the budget, which 
proposes certain deadlines for every step in the process. From the time a draft budget is 
submitted by the EC to the adoption of the budget (without any amendments) it should take 
42 days. However, with a potential Conciliation Committee convening, it could take up to 77 
days23. If the budget is not adopted by then, the EC is required to submit a new draft budget. 
Given this framework, I first look at the time it took for the annual budgets to be adopted. 
Second, I more generally investigate whether there was a trend of increased member state 
objections, especially during and after the crisis. Thus, the tables below present the amount of 
time it takes for the negotiations to be finalized, and the number of phases in the negotiations 
(which directly reflects the amount of effort it takes te EC to get its budget approved). I 
consider a shorter time period and fewer phases in the budget negotiations to be advantageous 
to the EC, as this implies fewer modifications to their original budget draft.  
 
 
23 Note that this is the number days from the official deadline for the EC to submit its budget proposal. In effect, 
the EC usually submits the budget proposal a long time before, allowing for more days of negotiation. 
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FIGURE 7 - DURATION OF BUDGET NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Source: Various documents from EUR-lex (2020a)24 
 
Figure 7 illustrates the duration of the budget negotiations for every year within the 
proposition 3 timeframe (2003-2013). Note that the specific years in the table are for the next 
year’s budget. For instance, 2003 is not the budget for 2003, but the budget for 2004. As the 
budget for every year was negotiated the year before, and finalized in either November or 
December, the years in the table represent the year the budget negotiation took place. The 
blue line represents the number of days of budget negotiation for every year, while the dotted 
orange line represents the overall average of days.  
     As evident in the figure, there are not any significant variations to observe during the 
period 2003-2012. There is some variation in the exact number of days for each budget 
negotiation, but they are all in the narrow range of a minimum of 202 and maximum of 232 
days.  As mentioned, one reason the number of days is so high, is that the EC usually submits 
their draft budget a lot earlier than the deadline on 1 September of every year, thus leaving a 
lot of time for thorough negotiation. The Council tends to submit its position early as well, 
 
24 Further details in Annex 3. 
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usually around June-July-August, which leaves a lot of time for the Parliament to suggest 
adjustments to the budget proposal. The only time the number of days drops significantly is in 
2013, where duration of the negotiations lasted 145 days, a drop of 86 days from the previous 
year. The reason for this drop is simply because the EC did not submit its draft until 28 June, 
32 days later than the second latest submission in 27 May 2005, and an astounding 69 days 
later than the earliest submission in 20 April 2011. Interestingly, 2013 was also the year of the 
earliest budget adoption, on 20 November, the only year where the budget was adopted prior 
to December.  
     On the whole, there is not much to draw from these numbers, at least on their own. Yes, 
there was some variation in the first ten years, but no consistent developments. Of course, the 
last year is interesting, as it indicates that the budget negotiations were sped up substantially. 
However, a single observation is not enough to draw any conclusions from, and it also does 
not represent any obvious trend in the data. Hence, I prefer to see this as an outlier rather than 
an indication of any underlying reflection with respect to the EC’s legitimacy. Overall, these 
results reflect that the EU system has strict deadlines for every submission and position in the 
budget process, such that the amount of time in practice cannot be a major factor in the budget 
negotiations.  
     I am more curious about the results presented in table 5.8 below, where the number of 
stages in the budget negotiations is illustrated. This provides a better picture of the potential 
challenges of the EC’s task of getting its budget proposals accepted. More specifically, figure 
8 shows the number of stages required for every year, in order to get the budget adopted. The 
blue line represents the number of stages per year, while the dotted orange line represents the 
average amount of stages in the timeframe (2003-2013). 
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FIGURE 8 - STAGES OF BUDGET NEGOTIATION
 
Source: Various documents from EUR-lex (2020a) 
 
The initial trend (from 2003 to 2009) is the that it takes around six stages for the budget to be 
adopted. The only exception is the year 2006, where seven stages were required. As 
mentioned in 2.1.6, the minimum number of stages for a budget to be adopted, is three. First, 
the EC’s budget draft must be submitted (by 1 September); second, the Council must give its 
position; and finally, the Parliament must state its position on the Council’s position. Thus, if 
the Parliament approves, and a majority of votes are cast (or they do not take a decision by 13 
November), the budget is adopted. During the timeframe, such effortless negotiations do not 
occur. The standard procedure during the timeframe is that all the institutions make 
modifications to the initial budget proposal, and in this case a Conciliation Committee (CC) is 
convened. So, during the first half of the timeframe, the stages include the 1. EC draft 2. The 
Council’s position. 3. The Parliament’s position. 4. CC convening25. 5. The CC agreeing on a 
Joint Text. 6. Approval of the Council and the Parliament. In 2006, there was required an 
additional round of CC meetings before they could agree on a join text.  
 




     Interestingly, during the days of the crisis in 2010, there are alterations to the virtual status 
quo. In this year, the CC could not agree on a Joint Text within the required 21 days, which 
forced the EC to suggest a new draft budget. When the new budget draft was submitted, 
however, it was adopted by both the Council and the Parliament without further amendments. 
The following year, now well into the crisis, the situation improved slightly. However, the CC 
negotiations were still stretched to the last minute, but they did manage to produce a Joint 
Text that subsequently was approved by the Council and the Parliament, sparing the EC the 
hassle of once again returning to the drawing board. In the ensuing year, the EC experienced 
similar problems to 2010 during the budget negotiations. Once again, the CC could not 
produce a Joint Text, requiring the EC to create an entirely fresh draft. The legislative 
branches adopted the new budget draft without further CC intervention. In 2013, the final year 
of the timeline, the negotiations mirror those of 2011, where the CC convened, and managed 
to present a submit a Joint Text, which was subsequently adopted. 
     The results in figure 5.8 suggest that the budget negotiations clearly always are a tricky 
affair in the timeframe. This is by itself not a negative phenomenon. Conversely, it is positive 
that all three institutions get a say in such a crucial matter that is the annual budget of the 
European Union. It should thus not be considered a harmful situation for the EC to be 
challenged during the budget negotiations. However, this does become a different matter 
when the EC cannot get its budget approved, despite heavy negotiation and major 
amendments to the EC’s original draft. Of course, in the two occurrences (2010 and 2012) the 
draft eventually was rejected, they did submit new drafts, that ended up being adopted. 
However, this required a lot of negotiations and larger changes, which reflects the weaker 
position of the EC relative to the other European institutions. This is related to the 
proposition’s assertion, that the organization will lose ground if it is hindered in drafting the 
budget the sees fit. If the proposals are rejected, this does ultimately affect the legitimacy of 
the organization. Although the budget negotiations during the timeframe were always 
concluded prior to the 18 December deadline (in three instances, on the deadline day), this at 
least on part reflects the EC submitting their draft budgets a long time before the deadline for 
submission, allowing time for a potential situation where they have to submit an entirely new 




5.3.2 – Personnel 
As capital only makes up one half of this proposition, the personnel numbers are equally 
important. Fortunately, I was given access to data on the staff composition of the European 
Commission. With this data, I am able to observe the trends of staff recruitment before and 
during the crisis, as well as tracing differences in recruitment between the different member 
states.  
     Table 7 presents the composition of officials employed in the European Commission for 
every given year in the timeframe, by country. As seen, all 28 member states (as of 2013) are 
included in the table. Therefore, there are not any values for those member states that joined 
during the expansions in 2004, 2007 and 2013 in the years before they joined. Note that the 
values are in percentages. The reason I post the percentages instead of the absolute numbers, 




TABLE 7 - OFFICIALS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2003-2013) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
AT 2,1 2,1 2,0 2,0 1,9 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,7 1,8 1,7 
BE 23,8 23,1 22,3 22,1 21,3 19,3 18,8 18,5 18,2 18,2 17.9 
BG     0,4 0,6 0,9 1,2 1,8 2,0 2,1 
CY  0,1 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,4 
CZ  0,2 0,8 1,0 1,3 1,3 1,5 1,6 1,8 1,9 1,9 
DE 9,4 9,7 9,4 9,2 8,9 8,2 8,1 8,0 8,1 8,1 8,2 
DK 2,7 2,6 2,4 2,3 2,1 1,9 1,8 1,7 1,6 1,6 1,6 
ES 8,6 8,6 8,3 8,1 7,9 7,1 6,9 6,9 6,8 6,9 6,9 
EE  0,1 0,3 0,4 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,7 0,7 0,8 0,8 
FI 2,8 2,9 2,9 2,8 2,7 2,3 2,3 2,2 2,2 2,1 2,1 
FR 11,2 11,4 11,1 11,0 10,7 9,8 9,7 9,7 9,4 9,4 9,2 
GR 4,4 4,5 4,3 4,2 4,0 3,7 3,6 3,5 3,6 3,6 3,7 
HR           0,0 
HU  0,2 1,0 1,4 1,8 1,8 1,9 2,0 2,2 2,3 2,4 
IE 2,7 2,6 2,6 2,5 2,4 2,1 2,1 2,0 1,9 1,8 1,8 
IT 13,0 12,6 11,9 11,5 11,1 10,0 9,9 9,9 9,8 9,8 10,0 
LT  0,1 0,3 0,4 0,7 0,7 0,8 1,0 1,1 1,1 1,2 
LU 1,7 1,5 1,4 1,2 1,1 1,0 0,9 0,8 0,8 0,7 0,7 
LV  0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,8 0,8 
MT  0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,5 0,5 
NL 3,6 3,6 3,5 3,4 3,2 2,8 2,8 2,7 2,6 2,5 2.5 
PL  0,2 1,6 2,5 3,2 3,4 3,7 4,1 4,4 4,6 4,6 
PT 3,9 3,7 3,5 3,3 3,2 2,9 2,8 2,8 2,7 2,6 2,6 
RO     0,5 0,8 1,0 1,8 2,8 3,2 3,3 
SE 2,9 2,9 2,8 2,7 2,6 2,3 2,3 2,3 2,2 2,2 2,1 
SI  0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,8 0,9 
SK  0,1 0,4 0,6 0,9 0,9 1,0 1,1 1,2 1,2 1,3 
UK 7,0 6,9 6,6 6,3 5,9 5,3 5,0 4,8 4,6 4,4 4,3 
Other 0,2 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1 




     The general trend here is that the 2004 enlargement countries all start out with a very small 
share of officials in the EC in 2004, thus the numbers for the EU15 countries are still mostly 
the same, and remarkably, in a few cases, slightly higher than in 2003. However, over the 
years, there is naturally a move towards a new equilibrium, where the larger of the new 
countries take up an incrementally larger space in the administration. This, naturally, means 
that officials from the EU15 countries decrease their share over the years. However, around 
the middle of the timeframe, the changes do in most cases slow down, and the composition 
changes are not especially significant in the following years. Nevertheless, some member 
states do still continue the decline, an example being the UK, which drops in every single year 
of the timeframe, from 7 per cent in the first year, to 4,3 per cent in the final year (suggesting 
this decline is not only connected to the influx of new member states taking an incrementally 
larger share of the staff positions).  
     Table 8 shows the staffing figures for the EU-15 countries in the timeframe 2003-2013. 
 
TABLE 8 - STAFFING FIGURES FOR THE EU15 MEMBER STATES 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
AT 392 415 426 427 431 428 427 437 410 417 408 
BE 4451 4632 4663 4756 4749 4764 4711 4647 4372 4334 4230 
DE 1763 1945 1956 1972 1982 2023 2022 2007 1932 1934 1936 
DK 503 512 502 486 470 458 444 427 392 383 379 
ES 1600 1717 1726 1742 1761 1757 1730 1734 1628 1630 1639 
FI 533 587 601 605 593 578 570 548 516 510 509 
FR 2094 2277 2320 2367 2398 2432 2429 2436 2255 2236 2184 
SE 539 590 593 591 582 569 564 568 524 515 509 
GR 831 902 907 902 899 903 891 891 855 851 872 
IE 506 527 542 544 533 527 517 501 457 431 427 
IT 2435 2517 2482 2467 2475 2481 2476 2484 2352 2334 2357 
LU 317 303 290 263 249 238 219 209 196 176 169 
NL 680 718 723 724 710 702 702 677 614 594 597 
PT 721 736 723 717 722 726 711 696 649 626 615 
UK 1316 1372 1382 1366 1324 1304 1258 1215 1092 1052 1011 
EU15 18681 19750 19836 19929 19878 19890 19671 19477 18244 18023 17842 
Source: Gravier & Roth (2020) 
 
Table 8 reveals that staffing figures in the EU-15 countries overall increased in the early part 
of the timeframe, even though their share of the Commission staff declined in this time period 
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(see table 5.9 above). This increase was in fact the trend until 2008, after which the absolute 
figures reveal that the trend in general is negative. What the reason for this general decline in 
the EU15 staffing figures are is not certain. Nevertheless, the first sign of decline occurred 
during 2008-2009, which coincides with the Global Recession. However, the first significant 
fall in EU15 staffing figures transpired from 2010 to 2013. This does correlate well with the 
initiation European debt crisis and could imply that the image of the EC among its staffers 
was impacted, especially the staffers of the ‘old’ EU15 countries.  
     Table 9 below contrasts the numbers EU15 numbers with the new member states. It 
presents the absolute numbers for the EU12 member states in the 2003-2013 timeframe. Note 
that Croatia is not included in this table, as only four staff members had joined by 2013. 
 
TABLE 9 - STAFFING FIGURES FOR THE EU12 MEMBER STATES 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
CY  12 35 54 73 90 93 103 100 94 96 
CZ  43 163 219 300 330 370 410 427 448 439 
EE  18 61 96 125 147 155 174 176 184 184 
HU  49 211 298 397 438 465 514 535 556 580 
LT  19 58 86 147 180 204 239 262 273 275 
LV  13 38 57 99 115 141 170 180 186 192 
MT  6 19 44 68 78 92 102 106 116 115 
PL  42 343 534 721 849 929 1042 1053 1090 1093 
SK  19 78 129 198 225 246 281 290 294 298 
SI  15 44 71 94 116 144 172 182 197 207 
BG     82 145 216 292 430 481 499 
RO     105 207 325 442 668 756 793 
EU12 0 236 1050 1588 2409 2920 3353 3941 4409 4536 4771 
Source: Gravier & Roth (2020) 
 
The trend of the EU15 member states is not mirrored in the EU12 numbers. The rapid 
increase in staffing figures for these countries is of course very palpable, as they all start from 
scratch. As they are nearing an equilibrium in the last years of the timeframe, the rate of 
expansion does slow down, most noticeable for the 2004 member states, who had a three-year 
head start on Bulgaria and Romania. During the last years, the increase is only trivial for the 
2004 member states, with Malta and Czechia actually falling slightly. Interestingly, the 




     All the numbers present some interesting trends. Overall, the findings suggest that the EC 
is struggling to attract enough talent in the EU15 member states in the later years on the time 
period under analysis, while this is clearly not the case in EU12 countries. This undermines 
any interpretation of these trends as being reflective of a general austerity drive due to the 
debt crisis. Rather, it suggests that the EC is struggling to attract staff in a specific subsection 
of its population. Whether this is due to a reduction of its legitimacy and a decline in 
applications numbers from these countries is very hard to say based on these numbers, but it 
arguably is not a good sign. 
 
5.4 – Tainted Reputation 
The fourth proposition relates to how the EU citizens view the EC and the EU. To find out 
whether the EC’s reputation has withered following the European debt crisis, I use data from 
three survey questions from the Eurobarometer 63-84 publications, covering the timeframe of 
2006-2015. Further details about this in sections 3.4.4 and 4.2.4. The first question concerns 
the EU citizens’ image of the EU. In figure 9 below, a graph presents development from 





FIGURE 9 - IMAGE OF THE EU 
 
Source: The data has been extracted from the Eurobarometer 65-84 (2006-2015). 
 
Figure 9 illustrates how the EU citizens from all the EU member states assess the image of the 
EU. The blue dotted line represents “positive” opinions (very positive + fairly positive), the 
orange line represents the “negative” opinions (very negative + fairly negative), the grey line 
represents “neutral” opinions, while the yellow line represents “don’t know” (DK). The Y-
axis numbers are in percentages. The black vertical bar indicates the start of the debt crisis. As 
mentioned above, I included the data from Bulgaria and Romania in the first two issues (2006 
spring and autumn), even though they were only acceding members states, and did not attain 
full membership until January 2007. In addition, the numbers from Croatia were not included 
in the years 2013-2015, as they did not become a member state before 2013. 
     As evident, the respondents that had a positive view of the EU were fairly strong in the 
early years of the timeframe. Around half of the respondents had a positive view of the EU 
the first years, with only dipping to about 45 per cent in in 2008-2009. Another positive for 
the EU was that only around 15 per cent of the respondents had a negative image of the EU in 
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the early years of the timeframe.26 As the global recession gained a foothold across Europe, 
this is reflected in the graph with the positive image of the EU slowly decreasing after the 
Spring of 2009. As the debt crisis emerged in 2010 and onwards, the positive numbers take a 
further 10 per cent dive, stabilizing at around 30 per cent from 2011 through 2013. Mirroring 
this trend are the negative numbers. Every time the positive numbers dip, the negative 
numbers increase. From around 15 per cent in 2006, the numbers increase to the upper 20s 
from 2011 through 2013. Reaching a high of 29 per cent in late 2012 and early 2013. This 
time would prove to be rock-bottom with regards to the image of the EU, with neutral 
numbers at the same time at 39. As 2012-2013 this period can be considered the apex of the 
crisis, it does make sense that this is when the numbers were at their worst, with high 
unemployment numbers, unprecedented media coverage and a general sense of uncertainty 
across the European population. The latter part of the graph does however show some 
encouraging signs. During 2014 and the first half of 2015 the number of those with a positive 
image gradually increased to 40 per cent, while the negative number fell to 19 per cent, with 
the gap between the negative and positive up from a 1 per cent difference to 21 per cent.  
     The trend thus displays a massive decline in the EUs image from the early years to the 
middle of the crisis. This is in line with what I expected, as people can be influenced by their 
personal economic situation, the general economic situation and uncertainty during times of 
crisis. Nevertheless, the image of the EU did improve in the latter years of the crisis, and the 
positive numbers in 2015 had increased by 10 per cent since the worst numbers in late 2012 
and early 2013. That being said, these numbers did not recover to the same level as in the 
years before the crisis. The highest positive numbers the EU had in the post-crisis years was 
around 40 per cent. That is still more than 10 per cent less than the highest results in pre-crisis 
years. These numbers do indicate that the EU image took a massive hit after the crisis, and the 
trend is not that these numbers are on a speedy recovery, although the curve was positive until 
the first half of 2015.  
     Figure 10 presents the data for question 2 (Q2) in the graph below: 
 
26 The number of respondents who had a neutral view of the EU, was around 30 per cent, and gradually 
increased to around 40 per cent in 2010. Some of this high share of neutral responses is likely because 
knowledge about the EU was not too widespread, and many simply did not have strong positive or negative 
associations to the EU. 
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FIGURE 10 “MY VOICE COUNTS IN THE EU” 
 
Source: The data has been extracted from the Eurobarometer 65-84 (2006-2015). 
 
Figure 10 illustrates the opinions on whether or not the respondents agree with the statement: 
“my voice counts in the EU”. The blue dotted line represents those who “tend to agree”, while 
the orange line represents the ones who “tend to disagree”, and the grey line represents “don’t 
know” (DK). The Y-axis numbers are in percentages. The black vertical bar indicates the start 
of the debt crisis. In contrast to the two other questions, the Q2 is missing in the 72nd edition 
(Autumn 2009). I do, however, not see this as a major problem, as the general trend over time 
is what I am studying. Hence, it is not my intention to observe and study every single time 
point individually.  
     As opposed to Q1 presented in figure 9, the development throughout the timeframe is not 
as substantial. However, there is some interesting variation during the e crisis years. As the 
graph visibly illustrates, the EU citizens were never really confident in the value of their 
influence in the EU system. In the first year, 2006, over half of the respondents expressed that 
they did not agree with statement “my voice counts in the EU”. Only around 35 per cent 
believed that their vote counted. Thus, this was clearly a challenge for the EU even long 
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before the crisis years.27 In 2009 these numbers changed slightly, with the those disagreeing 
with the statement falling to 2006-levels of around 50 per cent, and the number of those 
agreeing reaching a then high of almost 40 per cent. This is likely coinciding with the 2009 
European Parliament elections, where EU citizens had the opportunity to vote in the election, 
and thus probably feeling more confident about their voice counting. However, as this was at 
the dawn of the crisis, the numbers gradually deteriorated afterwards, with the disagreement 
numbers reaching almost 70 per cent in early 2013. The numbers of those agreeing fell to 
below 30 percent, while the DK fell to around 5 per cent. However, in a very interesting turn 
of events, the 2014 numbers improved considerably. Similar to 2009, the impact of being an 
election year likely played a major part in this. Those who agreed with the statement now 
numbered a little over 40 per cent, while those disagreeing had sunk to slightly over 50 per 
cent. However, unlike 2009, the numbers would remain more stable for the rest of the 
timeframe, with only a slight negative dip in late 2015. While having around half of the EU 
citizens considering their vote ineffectual should not be considered a positive result in the 
eyes of the EC, it is definitely a step in the right direction compared to 2011-13. As the EC 
has targeted making the EU more accessible to the general body of EU citizens, and less of a 
perceived elite project, this is at least a facet of that process they can look to with some 
encouragement. However, there remains a long way to go.  









27 Another interesting observation is that the level of “don’t know” (DK) are fairly substantial for Q2. In Q1, the 
DK was at 1-2 per cent - in other words, rather insignificant. However, in Q1 the respondents had the option of 
responding that they had a neutral image of the EU, which likely accounted for many of those who did not know 
too much about the EU. 
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FIGURE 11 - TRUST IN THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
Source: The data has been extracted from the Eurobarometer 65-84 (2006-2015). 
 
Figure 11 illustrates the EU citizens level of trust in the EC. The blue dotted line represents 
those who “tend to trust” the European Commission, while the orange line represents the ones 
who “tend not to trust” it. The grey line represents “don’t know” (DK). The Y-axis numbers 
are in percentages. The black vertical bar indicates the start of the debt crisis. 
     The graph illustrates that the EC did enjoy a considerable amount of trust in the early years 
of the timeframe. Around half of the respondents expressed that they tended to trust the EC, 
while around 30 per cent tended not to trust it. Interestingly, the number of “don’t know” 
(DK) were very substantial. This indicates that many did not know much about the EC, or at 
least they did not know what they should expect of the EC. The DK numbers remain fairly 
high throughout the timeframe, rarely dipping far below 20 per cent. Around 2007-2008 the 
trust number gradually starts to decrease, and the pivotal moment occurred between early 
2011 and late 2011, when the number of respondents expressing distrust exceeded the number 
of respondents trusting the EC. The number of those expressing distrust gradually increased, 
eventually stabilizing at close to 50 per cent during the crisis years. The worst measure for the 
EC’s level of trust was early 2014, when level of distrust was around 15 per cent higher than 
the level of trust. During late 2014 and early 2015 the numbers did improve slightly, and the 
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level of both distrust and trust was at 40 per cent by early 2015.  
     In the eyes of the EC, looking at this graph must be very concerning. They started out as 
an organization with a fairly high level of trust, but eventually became more distrusted than 
trusted. Of course, that the trust numbers decreased somewhat during the crisis is not 
unexpected. However, not being able to recover to similar heights after the crisis is 
problematic. That they in the eyes of the citizens became more distrusted than trusted, speaks 
to how people perceive the EC’s handling of the crisis.  
 
5.5 – Overall Discussion 
As the four propositions in the previous sections have been analyzed independently, it is time 
to discuss the results together. When looking at the data for all the propositions, the findings 
did not present a general proposition-wide negative or positive trend. Some of the results did 
show that the trend was negative, that the debt crisis indeed did seems to affect the EC, while 
other results suggested fewer observable changes during the crisis years and beyond. 
However, overall, the trend is that the EC has to some extent struggled in all four 
propositions. One area the development truly took a turn for the worse is in the fourth 
proposition, predominantly in Q1 (the image of EU) and Q3 (trust in the EC). Here, there are 
signs that the EC truly have struggled with their reputation throughout the crisis. The majority 
of the respondents had a positive view of the EU, while the EC maintained a high level of 
trust in the years before the crisis, a trend that for both Q1 and Q3 reversed completely during 
2010-2011. It should be noted that Q2 (voice counts in the EU), has a different curve. While 
the number of respondents that did not agree that their voice counts in the EU increased in the 
crisis years (2010 and onwards), this number actually decreased in the latter part of the 
timeframe, while the number of those who agreed with the statement increased, culminating 
in a better outlook for the EC with regards to the citizens’ impression of how much their vote 
counts than before the crisis. However, the majority still disagrees with the statement, and the 
number of those who agree has not come close to the number of those who disagree during 
the timeframe, signaling that this is a major issue for the EC, despite the positive, yet 
minimal, improvement in the numbers. 
     Another instance of a proposition that did not attest to a glowing positive trend for the EC 
is proposition 1. The fact that the mean success-rate of the EC decreased significantly in the 
crisis years and after, is not the development that is to be expected from the management in a 
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crisis. The EC should be able to still submit legislation that would efficiently hinder the crisis 
from expanding further, and not face increased opposition from the legislative branches. This 
trend is also evident in proposition 2, where the criticism towards the EC from its allies 
indeed increased during the crisis years. It did not help that the number of supportive 
statements decreased in the later stages and the aftermath. 
     While, the three mentioned propositions mainly suggest a negative trend for the EC during 
and after the crisis, the findings in proposition 3 are less negative. The capital part of the 
proposition shows that the while it displays a slightly negative trend, with the EC having to 
submit an entirely new budget draft twice in the crisis years, the budgets were all adopted 
before the annual deadline, which can in part be attributed to the EC, because the budget 
drafts were always submitted a long time before the draft deadline. As to the personnel part, 
the trend is that the new EU member states (of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements), quickly 
gained ground within the EC administrative staff, the development showed that a great deal of 
the older member states (those from before 2004, EU15) increased their number of staffs in 
the early years of the timeframe, prior to the crisis, but their numbers started to decrease 
during and after the crisis, in many cases rapidly. With regard to how many inhabitants these 
EU15 countries represent (about 3/4 of the EU population in 2007), this is a discouraging 
development. However, the decline is not large enough to make it a convincing argument for 
a general struggle for the EC to be able to recruit personnel. 
     Overall, the trend is clearly not a positive one for the EC. Most of the data does point in a 
negative direction, while some of the data do not show any clear pattern of decline. However, 
none of the data presented in this chapter exhibit any strong positive trends. In chapter 6, the 










Chapter 6 – Conclusive Discussion 
This study has examined how the European Commission’s legitimacy has been affected by 
the European debt crisis of 2010. It started with the introduction of the topic and the research 
question in chapter 1, as well as introducing the model this thesis would be based on. Chapter 
2 discussed the context and the background of the European Union, the European 
Commission, the euro, the European debt crisis, as well as introducing a number of 
established legitimacy issues the EC and the EU had been struggling with in the years prior to 
the crisis. Chapter 3 examined the theoretical framework of the thesis, first reviewing existing 
literature on the legitimacy of organizations, before going further into detail on Hamilton’s 
model, as well as expanding on the four propositions. This was followed up by a part where it 
was assessed whether the model was applicable to public organizations as well as the private 
organizations studied by Hamilton. Additionally, the propositions were discussed in further 
detail, in addition to assessing their applicability to my study of the EC during the debt crisis. 
In addition, it was argued whether or not the model could be restated, in order to better suit 
the study of the EC during crisis. Finally, the chapter included operationalizations of every 
proposition, in order to facilitate how they could best be measured. Chapter 4 reviewed the 
methodological choices for the measurement of every proposition, as well as discussing the 
why the single-outcome study was the most suitable type of case study for the thesis. 
Furthermore, the collected data for the thesis was presented, and discussed. Next, the different 
methods utilized in the thesis were conferred. Finally, questions of measurement issues, as 
well as reliability and validity were deliberated over. In chapter 5, all the findings for the 
different propositions were discussed, concluding the chapter with a short overall discussion 
about the findings. The remaining part of this chapter answers every proposition, as well the 
research question. The final section will discuss how this work can be built upon, and discuss 
limitations to my study, thus, hopefully motivating other scholars to carry on the torch, 
investigating aspects this study was unable to.  
 
6.1 – Answer to the Research Question and the Propositions  
As all the propositions have been analyzed thoroughly in chapter 5, this section provides an 
answer to said propositions. First, every proposition is answered independently, then the 




6.1.1 – Answer to Proposition 1 
The first proposition seeks to measure the relationship between a crisis and the management’s 
ability to maneuver in response to the crisis. The proposition states that: 
A crisis will impair management’s ability to maneuver in terms of defending, repairing 
or maintaining the organization’s viability. 
In this proposition, I have analyzed the findings in the data related to the leadership’s 
performance. The leadership is defined as the College of Commissioners (as mentioned in 
3.4.1), which is thus the body responsible for leading the EU, as well leading and 
coordinating the important task of proposing and submitting legislation. 
     Looking at the mean success-rate of the pre-crisis years (2006-2009), the number is 
significantly higher than that of the post-crisis years (2010-2015). It should be noted that there 
are large variations in the success-rate of the pre-crisis years, from 61,2 in 2006 to 84,0 in 
2008. This is evident in the post-crisis years as well, as the success-rate ranges from 49,6 
(2015) to 81,1 (2011). However, this does not hide the fact that the post-crisis years over time 
ends up with a mean of only 66,3, as opposed to the pre-crisis years mean success-rate of 
74,7, which is 8,4 over that of the post-crisis years. The findings related to this proposition 
suggest that the there is a change from the pre-crisis years to the crisis and post-crisis years. 
This is consistent with the statement of the proposition, that the management’s ability to 
maneuver indeed was impaired by the crisis.  
 
6.1.2 – Answer to Proposition 2 
The seconds proposition seeks to measure the relationship between a crisis and the 
estrangement of allied organizations. The proposition states that: 
A crisis will sever an organization’s external ties. 
The second proposition was measured by observing statements by a number of organizations 
that I assessed to be considered as allies of the organization in question, the EC. The chosen 
organizations are, the IMF, the ECB, the WTO, the World Bank and the UN. The proposition 
suggests that the crisis will eventually lead allied organizations to distance themselves from 
the organization in question, in order to avoid “guilt by association”. 
     The findings suggest that while the pre-crisis years show signs of support and neutral 
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statements by the EC’s allies, the post-crisis years change to an increased number of critical 
statements. Whereas, the early crisis period (2010-2012) show signs of continued support and 
neutrality, the latter part of the timeframe exhibits more a larger number of critical statements 
by the allies. Particularly, the fact that only one critical statement is found in the pre-crisis 
years, while six critical statements are found in the post-crisis years, makes the case for 
increased allied distancing stronger. In addition, the strong negative turnaround from an 
originally close ally like the IMF, due to converging opinions related to the austerity 
measures, is a blow for the EC. Thus, I find the trend of the statements is consistent with the 
proposition’s statement, that a crisis leads to a severing of external ties.  
 
6.1.3 – Answer to Proposition 3 
The third proposition seeks to measure the relationship between a crisis and a decrease in the 
organization’s ability to acquire necessary resources, such as capital and personnel. The 
proposition states that: 
A crisis will disrupt an organization’s critical resource flows. 
This proposition is separated into two parts, namely capital and personnel. The capital part is 
measured by analyzing the budget negotiations of the EU, while the personnel is measured by 
looking at the staff composition changes of the EC. It must be noted that timeframe of this 
proposition is slightly different to the other propositions. As detailed in 4.2.3, this is due to the 
fact that I was only able to acquire staff composition data from 2003 until 2013, as opposed to 
the other timeframes, which span from 2006 to 2015. Therefore, I also choose to analyze the 
EU budget negotiations in the timeframe 2003-2013, to remain consistent within the 
proposition.  
     The trend of the budget negotiations is generally that the number of budget negotiation 
stages (lower is better) of the pre-crisis period (2003-2009) is lower than those of the post-
crisis years (this equals the actual crisis years of 2010-2013). The post-crisis years show an 
increase to an average of 8, as opposed to the pre-crisis years average of 6.1. This is definitely 
not an encouraging trend for the EC. However, as noted in 5.5, the EC was able to get the 
budget adopted before the 18 December deadline during all of the years in the timeframe. 
Still, the fact that the EC had to formulate entirely new budget drafts in both 2010 and 2012, 
reflects rather badly on them, as this suggest that their initial proposals were so far from being 
acceptable to the Council and the Parliament, that the budget negotiations had to be 
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completely restarted for there to be a viable budget to be adopted. While I do not find the 
capital trend to be as strong as the other propositions, the trend is however consistent with the 
propositions statement. 
     Turning to the personnel part of the proposition, things are not very convincing. As 
addressed in 5.3.2 and 5.5, there is a decrease in staffers from the EU15 member states during 
the timeframe. However, the decrease started in 2009, a year before what is considered the 
first full year of the crisis. Nevertheless, this decline in staffers from the EU15 member states 
did endure throughout the post-crisis years. Also, the EU12 numbers kept increasing, even in 
the years after 2010. As I briefly touched upon in 5.3.2, it could be argued that this is a 
general austerity issue. In general, the austerity measures intended for cuts in public 
wages/personnel in certain member states, which would in turn ultimately affect staff 
employment within the EC. While the numbers in the EU15 are declining, I do not find it to 
be the most significant changes. In addition, the EU12 members staff numbers do increase 
slightly as well. Hence, I find the proposed effect of the crisis to be too weak to definitely find 
a consistent trend. 
     I do not find any of these two parts to be particularly supportive of the proposition’s 
statement. However, the capital part does definitely indicate a trend of increased budget 
negotiation issues in the post-crisis years. As for the personnel part, I find this even less 
convincing. Thus, it is somewhat of a tie, which is to say I cannot reject the proposition fully, 
but I cannot state it is consistent with the data. Accordingly, I would define it as an undecided 
proposition.  
 
6.1.4 – Answer to Proposition 4 
The fourth proposition seeks to measure the relationship between a crisis and a staining in the 
organization’s reputation among its stakeholders, being the EU citizens. The proposition 
states that: 
A crisis will taint an organization’s reputation 
This proposition was operationalized in order to be measured by the three questions from the 
Eurobarometer surveys during 2006-2015, Q1, Q2 and Q3. The first, Q1, is a question asking 
the respondents whether they find the EU has a positive, neutral or a negative image. These 
answers do mark a clear trend. The pre-crisis years marked a positive period for the EU, 
where around half the respondents had a positive image of the EU, while only around 15 per 
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cent had a negative image of the EU. This trend remains pretty stable until the crisis years in 
2010 and onwards, and there is little doubt that the image of the EU suffered immensely 
during these years. In 2010, the image of the EU started to decline, and would continue to do 
so many years. It should be noted that his trend did go in a slightly positive direction during 
the last years of the timeframe. However, the EU’s image would never return to the pre-crisis 
levels. There is no doubt in my eyes that the EU’s image took a big hit during and after the 
crisis years. As discussed in 5.4, there are likely numerous reasons for this, although I believe 
the EC’s (as well as other leading actors, like the ECB) lack of responsiveness and resolve 
played a large part. In addition, the controversial measures of austerity discussed in 2.3.3, 
likely played a large play in damaging the EU’s and its leader’s reputation.  
     The next question, Q2, asked the respondents whether or not they tended to agree with the 
statement: “My voice counts in the EU”. This was an issue the EU was struggling with well 
before the crisis, namely, citizens largely did not believe their voice counted. During the pre-
crisis years, the answers remained relatively stable, between 50 and 60 per cent of the 
population did not believe their voice had any real value in the EU, and thus, their input, 
usually voting, could be considered hollow. At the same time, around 30-35 per cent tended to 
believe that their voices did count. This was alarming for the EU, and very damaging to its 
legitimacy, as in part required the citizen’s input and participation. This trend would only be 
exacerbated during the crisis years and would later reach a considerable number of 
respondents disagreeing with the statement, nearly 70 per cent in early 2013. By 2014 the 
numbers had improved massively and would remain roughly the same for the rest of the 
timeframe. This drastic improvement in the numbers is, as mentioned in 5.4, something I 
attribute to the European Parliament elections of 2009 and 2014, as the positive correlation is 
apparent in both years. What separates these years, is that 2009 is followed by a mass decline 
in positive responses, while the 2014 responses remain stable in the following years. Thus, as 
those who disagree with the statement still outnumber those who agree, it is still a step in the 
right direction, as the last years of the timeframe are the best numbers recorded during the 
ten-year period. 
     The third question, Q3, largely mirrors the trend in Q1. The EC’s trust among the citizens 
was fairly high in the pre-crisis years, and it did suffer a substantial fall in the post-crisis 
years. As mentioned in 5.4, the pivotal moment in the decline of EC trust happened between 
early 2011 and late 2011, when the number of those who tended not to trust exceeded the 
number of those who tended to trust the EC. In the post-crisis years, the level of trust did not 
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recover (albeit there is a slight positive spike in early 2015). As the number of those who 
tended to trust the EC in the early years of the timeframe exceeded those who tended not to 
trust the EC by roughly 20 per cent, this fall can be considered to be significant. 
     Therefore, as I find Q1 and Q3 to be clearly a negative trend for the EU and the EC, I do 
assess the findings to be consistent with the propositions statement that the European debt 
crisis has tainted the EC’s reputation. It is not forgotten that the Q2 did show encouraging 
signs, with the final years of the crisis actual improving the numbers from the pre-crisis years. 
It is however, only slightly, and it is not significant enough to outweigh the more drastic 
negative results of Q1 and Q3. 
 
6.1.5 – Answer to the Research Question 
The research question of this thesis has been the guiding line for my study on the European 
Commission, and how its legitimacy has been affected by the European debt crisis. To 
reiterate, the research question stands as follows:  
 
“What have been the effects of the European debt crisis on the European 
Commission’s legitimacy as an organization?” 
 
To answer the RQ plainly: The effects on the European Commission’s legitimacy following 
the debt crisis have overall been negative. By looking through the lens of the propositions, 
there is no doubt the crisis has taken its toll on the EC. In the previous sections, I concluded 
that in three out of the four propositions, the findings were consistent with the propositions’ 
assertions. These were proposition 1, proposition 2, and proposition 4. So, what about 
proposition 3? As mentioned, I assess it to be undecided, rather than not consistent, as the 
proposition is split into two parts, namely budget and personnel, where the budget part is 
consistent with the proposition’s assertion, while the findings in the personnel part is not 
entirely convincing, as I believe the decline in personnel is not significantly large (the number 
89 
 
even increased in the EU1228 member states after the crisis). However, for the undecided 
proposition 3 to outweigh the conclusions of proposition 1, 2 and 4, the trends in the 
proposition would have to be a large step in a positive direction for the EC, and that cannot be 
found. In figure 12 below, the restated model of Hamilton’s (2006) model, updated with 
answers to the propositions is listed. 
 
 
FIGURE 12 - THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN A CRISIS AND ORGANIZATIONAL LOSS OF 
LEGITIMACY – WITH RESULTS. 
 
Figure 12 shows the model presented in 3.3 (figure 1), updated with the answers to the 
propositions. The model basically asserts that the debt crisis has led to organizational loss of 
legitimacy, measured through the four propositions. So, can it be claimed that the European 
Commission has suffered from an organizational loss of legitimacy following the debt crisis? 
Yes. The data is consistent with the propositions, and in the one proposition I deemed not 
convincingly consistent, it was certainly not any positive trend to measure, it was just not a 
 
28 As mentioned in 5.3.2, the EU12 consists of the countries of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements, while the EU15 
are the members states from before 2004.  
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definitive as the other three propositions. So, what does it mean for the EC to experiencing a 
loss of legitimacy? It is not positive, and according to theories of legitimacy, if the downward 
spiral does continue, it could ultimately end up in a legitimacy crisis. Sadly, this thesis is not 
able to do any further research on the potential quest towards a legitimacy crisis, however that 
is definitely something that could be considered for future studies, which is elaborated upon 
in the following section. 
 
6.2 – Future Research 
I consider there to be several avenues of which this study can be built upon in the future. First 
of all, I think the model can be applied to studies on different regional or international 
organizations. As I demonstrate in section 3.3, the model, which was used to study private 
organization in Hamilton’s paper, is very much applicable to public organizations. A similar 
study, for instance, assessing the legitimacy of the World Health Organization (WHO) after 
the COVID-19 pandemic could be very interesting, and is something I would absolutely 
encourage, provided you have access to relevant data. 
     Another approach is simply to continue where this study concluded. As I expressed 
towards the end of the last section, I dejectedly cannot continue exploring whether the EC the 
loss of legitimacy potentially has led the EC into a legitimacy crisis. However, I imagine a 
study of the EC, starting where this study left of, then reverting my model in a similar fashion 
to what I did in section 3.3, with loss of legitimacy leading to a legitimacy crisis, through the 
lens of the same propositions (1-4), could be a very fruitful and interesting study. A similar 
study of other EU institutions, such as the ECB or the EU as a whole, if you have the 
resources, data, and plenty of time.  
     Hopefully many of the limitations of my study can be expanded upon in future research. 
For instance, making better sure that all the data is available earlier in the study. I did not get 
access to all of the data I enquired for. So, I believe remarkable results could be produced 
with the right operationalizations of the propositions, as well as the right data. With realistic 
expectations, and feasible goals, a future study based on the design of this study could truly 
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Data from the Eurobarometer 
 Issue nr. Edition Publication date 
1 65 Spring March 2006 
2 66 Autumn Sept. 2006 
3 67 Spring April 2007 
4 68 Autumn Sept. 2007 
5 69 Spring March 2008 
6 70 Autumn Oct. 2008 
7 71 Spring June 2009 
8 72 Autumn Oct. 2009 
9 73 Spring May 2010 
10 74 Autumn Nov. 2010 
11 75 Spring May 2011 
12 76 Autumn Nov. 2011 
13 77 Spring May 2012 
14 78 Autumn Nov. 2012 
15 79 Spring May 2013 
16 80 Autumn Nov. 2013 
17 81 Spring May 2014 
18 82 Autumn Nov. 2014 
19 83 Spring May 2015 
20 84 Autumn Nov. 2015 
 
Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/index#p=1&instrument
s=STANDARD&yearFrom=2006&yearTo=2015  
